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Abstract
How might new technical verification capabilities enhance the prospects of success in future
nuclear arms control negotiations? Both theory and evidence suggest that verification technologies
can influence the dynamics of arms control negotiations by shaping and constraining the arguments
and strategies that are available to the involved stakeholders. In the future, new technologies may help
transcend the specific verification challenge of high-security warhead authentication, which is a
verification capability needed in future disarmament scenarios that address fewer warheads, limit new
categories of warheads, and involve nuclear weapons states other than the United States and Russia.
Under these circumstances, the core challenge is maintaining the confidentiality of the classified
information related to the warheads under inspection, while providing transparency in the verification
process. This analysis focuses on a set of emerging warhead authentication approaches that rely on
the cryptographic concept of zero-knowledge proofs and intend to solve the paradox between secrecy
and transparency, making deeper reductions in warhead arsenals possible and thus facilitating future
nuclear arms control negotiations.
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Introduction
Over the past decades, the United States and Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, have engaged
in negotiating warhead reductions that have brought the global stockpile of nuclear weapons to only
a fraction of what it was at the height of the Cold War. These disarmament agreements focused on
limiting warheads that were affiliated with operationally deployed strategic delivery systems, allowing
their reductions to be verified through monitoring the delivery platforms.1 Disarmament in the U.S.Russia context, however, is unique in many respects and this past strategy of warhead reductions will
cease to be feasible in the future stages of arms control. The past definition of treaty-accountable
nuclear weapons will become insufficient in future disarmament scenarios, which include addressing
lower numbers of warheads, where the diversion of even one warhead becomes increasingly
significant; considering new categories of weapons under limitations, including tactical and nondeployed; and engaging other nuclear weapons states than the United States and Russia.2 All of these
factors contribute to the need to shift from a verification approach based on delivery systems, to a
verification approach focused on the warheads themselves.

Operationally deployed strategic warheads refer to strategic nuclear weapons that are mounted on their ballistic missile
launchers or that are located at aircraft bases, although the definition is somewhat dependent on the context. (Source:
Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed March 2,
2017, available at https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.)
1

The process of verification is comprised of collecting the information relevant to the treaty, which is referred to as
monitoring, and assessing what it signals about compliance, which is verification. In this thesis, I focus on this process as
a whole and use the term verification.
2 State Department definition of warhead categories: “The nuclear stockpile includes both active and inactive warheads.
Active warheads include strategic and non-strategic weapons maintained in an operational, ready-for-use configuration,
warheads that must be ready for possible deployment within a short timeframe, and logistics spares. They have tritium
bottles and other Limited Life Components installed. Inactive warheads are maintained at a depot in a non-operational
status, and have their tritium bottles removed. A retired warhead is removed from its delivery platform, is not functional,
and is not considered part of the nuclear stockpile. Warheads awaiting dismantlement constitute a significant fraction of the
total warhead population and will continue to grow as the New START Treaty is implemented and as unneeded
warheads are retired. A dismantled warhead is a warhead reduced to its component parts.” (Source: U.S. Department of
State. “Fact Sheet: Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/241377.pdf.)
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Figure 1. Source: Arms Control Association, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,”
updated January 2017, available online from
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.
The problems associated with the verification of individual warheads are multifold. The core
technical verification challenges in this disarmament scenario will relate to the high-security
authentication of warheads, their unique identification, maintaining the continuity of knowledge
throughout their life cycle, and several other issues.3 These technical verification challenges will emerge
at different stages of a warheads’ life cycle, from the initial tagging of the warheads when they leave
the production facility, to authentication when they enter the dismantlement facility, but all of these
different elements play a role in creating confidence and trust in an arms control agreement focused
on warheads.4 In this thesis, I will be focusing on the specific verification challenge of authenticating
warheads, or proving that the warhead under consideration is genuine and that the host state is not

3 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Verifying Baseline Declarations of Nuclear Warheads and Materials,” Innovating Verification
Series, July 2014, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/WG1_Verifying_Baseline_Declarations_FINAL.pdf?_=1405443895.

Frank von Hippel, “Verification of Nuclear Warheads and Their Dismantlement: A Joint American-Soviet Study,”
INMM 31st Annual Meeting (1990): 1.
4
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trying to deceive by offering blank warheads or employ other spoofing mechanisms. This verification
challenge is only one of the pieces of the puzzle in future disarmament verification, each of which
requires unique technical capabilities. This thesis will focus on exploring the applicability of novel
technical approaches to this specific future verification challenge.

Nuclear
archaeology
How many nuclear
warheads have states
historically produced?

Warhead
authentication
How to prove that an
inspected warhead is
genuine?

Unique
identification

Managed access
inspections

How to employ tags,
seals, and other
techniques to
identifyand track
individual warheads?

How to conduct on-site
inspections in sensitive
military facilities?

Undeclared
warheads
How to ensure that
the host state does not
withhold undeclared
warheads in covert
locations?

Perimeter-portal
monitoring
How to ensure that
there is no undeclared
traffic in and out of
inspectd facilities?

Figure 2. Verification challenges associated with disarmament agreements that focus on warheads,
rather than their delivery systems. The figure intends to illustrate the challenges involved, but is not
fully comprehensive. I thank Rebecca Hersman for helping me visualize these challenges, as
represented in this figure.
These verification challenges may be in the longer-term horizon, but overcoming them will be
essential for making future steps in disarmament possible. It is critical to think about these challenges
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now, even if further bilateral reductions in warheads between the United States and Russia are highly
uncertain, not to mention the prospects of negotiations with countries such as North Korea or
Pakistan. While these are the geopolitical realities at the moment, it does not mean that the
circumstances can change relatively rapidly. Furthermore, there is an argument to be made that these
interval periods are exactly the time new verification approaches can be conceptualized and developed.
These efforts are also driven by the increasing pressure from the international community
towards the nuclear weapons states, particularly in the context of the humanitarian movement to bring
attention to the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons. As reflected in the Resolution
A/C.1/71/L.41 that was passed in the United Nations General Assembly in October 2016 to begin
negotiations of a nuclear weapons ban treaty, the international community is increasingly willing to
call for the nuclear weapons states to move towards disarmament, as outlined in their obligations
under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).5 The key
question now is how the P5 states, or the five nuclear weapons defined under the NPT, are going to
respond to this pressure and engage with the rest of the international community. Beyond the P5, the
nuclear weapons states outside the NPT framework are creating increasing anxieties within the
international community. The nuclear balance in South Asia remains to be a key security concern for
many, as does North Korea.
The core of my thesis focuses on the particular verification challenge of authenticating nuclear
warheads. More specifically, the focus is on a presumed tradeoff of secrecy and transparency in the
authentication process, as it requires highly intrusive radiological measurements.6 The central challenge

5 United Nations General Assembly, 71st Session. General and complete disarmament: taking forward multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations, 2016 (A/C.1/71/L.41), available from
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/71/L.41.

Jie Yan and Alexander Glaser, “Nuclear Warhead Verification: A Review of Attribute and Template Systems,” Science
& Global Security 23 (2015), http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs23jieyan.pdf.
6
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is maintaining the confidentiality of classified and sensitive information related to the inspected
warheads, while providing transparency and a high level of confidence in the verification process. As
will be discussed, states have technical, political, and legal concerns related to revealing details about
their warheads, whereas from the inspectors’ perspective, this information is essential for the validity
of the authentication process. The specific warhead authentication mechanisms that I focus on in the
last chapter of the thesis, which use physical cryptography and zero-knowledge proofs, intend to
challenge this assumed tradeoff between secrecy and transparency.
Before the focused examination of this challenge, however, I establish a theoretical
understanding of the role of verification technologies in the politics of verification. This allows me to
create a more nuanced understanding of why verification matters, and move beyond the two extremes
that are continually argued in the arms control community – that either verification does not matter
at all, or that trust can only be achieved with stringent verification provisions. In the first chapter, I
make the case that the story is more complicated than what these two arguments assert.
Methodologically, this research applies the comparative method, as I operationalize verification
technologies as the variable under consideration and explain the causal mechanisms that explain how
they can contribute to negotiating nuclear weapons reductions, under conditions of high levels of
secrecy and distrust. My description of these processes involves two frameworks, one of which rests
on two-level game theory and the other analysis of sociotechnical systems.
I will make evident in the first chapter that the conceptualization of verification technologies
cannot be reduced to a purely technical, or a purely political, perspective – these technologies are
inherently involved in both dimensions. This is because verification arguments can be operationalized
as tools to further the political agendas and interests of the involved stakeholders, who have highly
divergent views about the value of arms control. The core argument is that verification technologies
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must be understood as both an independent and dependent variable. They can importantly shape the
politics of verification by constraining the arguments and strategies that are available to the involved
stakeholders, but this influence is dependent on the political conditions at that time. Thus, developing
new verification approaches is not going to be a panacea for making next steps in disarmament
possible, as these novel mechanisms can either further or impede the prospects for arms control,
depending on the political conditions of the time. Nevertheless, they play a meaningful role in the
process, which allows them to expand the possibilities and likelihood of new disarmament efforts
under the right conditions.
My thesis proceeds in the following way. The first chapter provides a framework for
understanding how verification technologies influence the politics of verification and starts to outline
the issue between secrecy and transparency. This establishes the basis for the following chapters, by
illuminating how the development of new verification approaches has an independent effect in
shaping the politics of verification, thus contributing to the dynamics of future arms control processes.
Then, the thesis dives into the verification challenge of warhead authentication. The second chapter
takes a historical perspective and shows how past warhead reduction measures have addressed the
seemingly intractable tradeoff between secrecy and transparency, with a focus on the SALT era, the
INF treaty, and the START era. Next, the third chapter explores the efforts have been made in the
past to counter the assumption that high-accuracy verification of warheads would not be possible
without compromising classified information, but how the issue of the authentication and certification
of the technical equipment used in these approaches has prevailed.
The fifth chapter shifts the perspective into the technical dimension of my thesis, providing
an overview of the physics, design, and detection of nuclear weapons, which is essential for
understanding the sixth chapter, which contains is the core of my technical examination. This chapter
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focuses on a set of novel approaches developed over the past years, based on zero-knowledge proofs,
where the core idea is that the classified design information is not measured by the verification system
in the first place due to the physics of the measurement system itself. Lastly, in my conclusion, I
discuss the implications of developing these verification approaches and how it might contribute to
the future directions of global nuclear arms control efforts. I argue that while novel verification
approaches, such as zero-knowledge verification, may never be fully implemented as such in an arms
control treaty, their development is important regardless – both for opening the dialogue on new
treaty architecture options, as well as shaping the political dynamics of the treaty negotiations
themselves.
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1. Why Verification Technologies Matter
I.

Introduction

One of the critical questions when thinking about the verification of arms control agreements
is the role that verification technologies have in this process. Verification technologies provide the
physical capabilities that allow the monitoring of treaty provisions, and subsequently the determination
of treaty compliance. The analysis of the role of verification technologies, however, cannot be reduced
to only the technical and physical dimension, as they also interlink to the political dimension of
verification. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an answer to the question of how verification
technologies influence the verification process of an arms control agreement, and why it matters what
verification technologies and capabilities are available when negotiating new treaties. This discussion
is essential for the overarching argument in this thesis, which is that the emergence of new verification
approaches for warheads is an essential step for making further nuclear arms reductions possible.
The commanding theme in answering this question is that verification technologies influence
the process of verification through several bidirectional relationships that relate both to technical and
political dynamics. This bidirectionality becomes evident in the way verification capabilities are
developed, as well as in the way that these capabilities influence verification negotiations. In both of
these situations, verification technologies are not only used to answer objective, technical questions,
but are also operationalized as political arguments and tools. This bidirectionality is also present in the
verification negotiations between states, which can be modeled as two-level games where the domestic
and international levels of political dynamics interact.
These mutually influential relationships, giving verification technologies both a technical and
political purpose, make the question meaningful to answer. Verification technologies are a
fundamental part of the verification process, but changes in the level of verification capabilities do not
12

lead to simple, predictable effects. Instead, these effects vary as a function of the political conditions
in which they take place, most importantly the current political actors and their interests. Ultimately,
understanding the role of verification technologies in the verification process condenses to
understanding these dynamic interactions between political negotiations and technology.
I argue that while the emergence of new verification approaches will not be a panacea for
settling disagreements about verification, they will importantly shape the politics of verification by
constraining the arguments and strategies that are available to the involved stakeholders. New
verification approaches can strengthen the positions of those promoting nuclear arms limitations by
expanding the verification choices that they can propose in the negotiations. Simultaneously, new
verification capabilities can weaken the arguments of arms control opponents who exaggerate
verification concerns and potential cheating opportunities. Thus, novel verification technologies
contribute to the facilitation of verification debates by altering their dynamics and shaping the
arguments that can be made by both opponents and proponents of arms control.
This analysis of the importance of verification technologies provides the justification for the
rest of my thesis. By showing that verification technologies can improve the prospects of future arms
control agreement, I can explain why developing novel verification capabilities can contribute to future
multilateral disarmament processes that involve unique requirements for verification systems and
protocols. I will specifically focus on the issue of transparency and secrecy in the ongoing debate about
warhead verification, and how the emerging idea of physical cryptographic verification approaches
can increase the likelihood of achieving new agreements that limit warheads. While these approaches
may never be fully implemented in the verification provisions of future arms control agreements, their
existence will have an impact on the argumentation dynamics of both arms control proponents and
opponents during the negotiations. These methods will make arms control opponents’ arguments
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about the ‘unverifiability’ of warhead limitations appear less legitimate, and allow the proponents of
arms control to propose valid mechanisms for verifying the terms of the agreement. Ultimately, the
success of these negotiations will depend on the balance of political interests and geopolitical
developments, but under the correct conditions, the successful development of these novel warhead
verification approaches can make a concrete contribution towards the future prospects of deeper cuts
in nuclear weapons.
This chapter will first explain the core technical and political challenges related to verification
technologies. Then, the chapter will analyze the existing political science literature on these topics and
provides a more formalized framework for understanding these challenges. This literature review
allows the discussion to be expanded and leads to my core argument: Changes in the available
verification capabilities cannot single-handedly make an arms control agreement possible, in the
absence of political will – but they can change the likelihood of an agreement by shifting the dynamics
of the negotiations. Thus, the impact of new verification technologies is channeled through both the
political and technical levels – they physically influence the choices and arguments that are available
to the different stakeholders, and thus shape the arguments that can be made about verification.

II.

Technical and Political Challenges

The fundamental purpose of verification is to determine whether parties to an arms control
agreement are complying with their commitments. In addition to providing the technical means to
monitor and detect potential violations, it also serves a political purpose in assuring the other parties
to the agreement that arms control measures promote, rather than compromise, their national security.
This assurance is intended for state leaders and political establishments, as well as domestic audiences

14

who are concerned about compliance issues relating to arms control measures.7 Furthermore,
verification is argued to influence the behavior of the participating states by creating a deterrent against
noncompliance. These functions provide the underlying justification for why verification is pursued
with arms control agreements, with either unilateral or mutual verification provisions.
A two-fold challenge relates to the technologies used in the verification process – the first
dimension is technical, and the second is political. The technical problem is having the right
verification capabilities available to satisfy the requirements that arise from both practical and political
needs. The second problem is political, meaning that the verification technologies are operationalized
as political tools by the different stakeholders in verification debates. The technologies’ attributes are
used as arguments to promote distinct political ends, which vary depending on the stakeholder in
question.
Thus, the attributes of the verification technologies are not only important for the physical
verification capabilities that they create, but also the way in which they can either accumulate or
alleviate distrust. This political dimension depends deeply on how easy it is to ‘verify’ the verification
capabilities themselves – or confirming that they operate as intended. In the context of warhead
verification, this means that the verification capabilities can confidently authenticate warheads without
revealing sensitive information; with test ban monitoring, this means that the verification capabilities
can detect nuclear explosions with high degree of accuracy within the intended thresholds. This is
essential for being able to educate and convince the negotiators that using these verification
capabilities will build trust and confidence in compliance. Thus, trust and confidence are critical
aspects of verification technologies – they are not only operated by inspectors and technical personnel,

7 U.S. National Security Council. National Security Decision Directive Number 65: Establishment of National Security Council
Arms Control Verification Committee. 1982.
https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDs/NSDD65.pdf
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but are also an important component of political actors’ decision-making process. This is why trust
becomes a critical variable in verification technologies.
Both the technical and political dimensions operate according to the dynamics of a feedback
loop. First, the technical challenge of having adequate technical verification capabilities relates how
policymakers define the verification needs in a particular arms control agreement. Negotiators
understand what is needed from technical verification capabilities to satisfy the political needs both
internationally and domestically. It is important to understand, however, that the process of defining
verification needs is highly subjective, and also liable to being used as a mechanism to promote specific
political agendas. Stricter requirements entail higher barriers for achieving agreement about arms
control, and, as will be discussed later, have been operationalized as a hindrance to arms control.
The requirements for verification technologies are relayed to the technological community,
informing technical personnel of the needs from the political side. This process takes place
domestically, such as with the U.S. national laboratories. It can also take place internationally, as joint
development programs for new technologies. The requirements from the political level inform the
technological community, which then adjusts its research programs to align with the conveyed needs.
The resulting new verification capabilities contribute to the prevailing systemic environment in which
policymakers operate. This links back to the first stage of the feedback loop, with the new systemic
environment influencing how policymakers determine the verification needs for a particular treaty.
This illustrates how the development of verification technologies and the definition of verification
requirements are mutually influential. These dynamics also show why it is too simplified to ask whether
policymakers determine the development of verification technologies, or whether available
verification technologies determine the verification provisions that are applied. The answer is both,
with bidirectional interactions between the political and technological spheres.
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It is also important to note that each of the stages of the feedback loop can be independently
influenced by external factors. Policymakers’ guidance is not the only factor that shapes the
development of verification technologies – it is also controlled by the internal dynamics of the
technological community and the emergence of new fundamental scientific knowledge. Thus,
influence from these factors can have an impact that is outside the control of policymakers, changing
the systemic environment in which verification debates take place.

Definition of
requirements
for verification
technologies

Newly
developed
verification
technologies
shape systemic
conditions

Development
of verification
technologies
according to
stated
requirements

Figure 1.1. The feedback loop describing the dynamic relationship between the political
stakeholders defining verification requirements and the technical community developing the
verification technologies.
The political dimension operates according to its own feedback loop. These dynamics can be
understood as a two-level game theoretical model, as will be discussed later, but also more generally
as a mutually influential relationship. This reflects the fact that the politics of verification relate both
to the domestic level, as well as the international level. The first level of two-level games takes place
in national politics, which are often factional and discordant. Different domestic interest groups
interact with governmental actors such that each side is trying to influence the other, or to create
17

alliances with groups that share their interests. The second level reflects international politics, where
state governments represented by selected negotiators interact with each other, and similarly exert
pressure or suggest alliances with actors that share their objectives.8 These two levels can be
understood as mutually influential. At the domestic level, international negotiations create external
pressure that can be deployed by domestic political actors to argue against their opponents and drive
their interests forward. At the same time, the dynamics of international negotiations depend on the
domestic political conditions in each participating state. Each national leader is constrained by their
domestic constituencies and factions, who must ultimately ratify or endorse the agreement reached
with other governments – otherwise the leader of the state may face difficult domestic challenges, or
even be voted out of power.9

8 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42
(1988): 434.
9

Ibid., 437.
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International
level

Country B:
Domestic
Level

Country A:
Domestic level

Figure 1.2. The political dynamics of verification negotiations on the international and domestic
level. As discussed later, the domestic level can be modeled after Robert Putnam’s framing in
“Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” This is also reflected in Table 1.1.
Country A – United States
Head of state
Cabinet members
Other members in
executive branch
Members of
parliament
Agency representatives

Experts
Interest groups

Barack Obama (President)
Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State); Robert Gates
(Secretary of Defense)

Country B – Russia
Dimitri Medvedev (President)
Sergey Lavrov (Foreign Minister of Russia)

Gen. James L. Jones (National Security Adviser)
State Duma (lower house of the Federal
Assembly of Russia)

United States Senate
Rose Gottemoeller* (Assistant Secretary of State
for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation);
Ellen Tauscher (Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control); Adm. Mike Mullen (Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff)
National laboratories (e.g. Los Alamos National
Laboratory)
Arms Control Association, Federation of American
Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility,
Heritage Foundation

Anatoly Antonov* (Director of security and
disarmament at the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs)
National laboratories (e.g. VNIIEF in Sarov)
Political and Military Analysis Institute,
Carnegie Moscow Center

Table 1.1. The domestic level as conceptualized by Robert Putnam in “Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” applied to the real conditions during the New START
negotiations between 2009 and 2011. The star refers to the lead negotiators.
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III.

The Political Stakeholders

As has been alluded to previously, the stakeholders engaged in verification debates may hold
differing views about the verification needs for a specific arms control agreement. These divisions
surface due to divisions between countries about the purpose and logic of verification, as well as due
to divisions within countries. With respect to states, it is evident that there are general differences
between state perceptions about the role of verification in arms control. This has been most visible
between the United States and Russia, who have had the most experience in negotiating verification
protocols. The U.S. position throughout the Cold War was to emphasize the objective, neutral, and
technical nature of verification, since depicting “verification demands as scientifically correct and thus
nonnegotiable makes for a stronger bargaining position.”10 Cultural factors also contributed to this
perception, as it is compatible with the ideals of scientific rationalism, Western empiricism, and the
“liberal faith in the unproblematic nature of knowledge.”11 The U.S. perspective can be contrasted
with Soviet views about verification, which saw the process as inherently subjective and strategic, as
“a double-edged sword that can be used for good or ill, depending on political relations.”12
These national views, however, can also fluctuate over time. In the 1980s, for example, the
United States reduced its verification demands, while the Soviet Union was willing to pursue “triple
verification” that included extensive data exchanges and comprehensive on-site inspections.13 These
shifts often reflect more general changes in the state’s position on arms control, which illuminates
how perspectives about verification are inherently linked to more general attitudes towards arms
control. The within-country spectrum of viewpoints about verification, which are discussed next,
10

Nancy Gallagher, The Politics of Verification (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 30.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

13

Murray Feshbach, edit., National Security Issues of the USSR (New York: Springer, 1987), 86.
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change as the strategic calculations about arms control change. Since the end of the Cold War, the
United States has seen warhead reductions as a stabilizer in U.S.-Russian relations and, during the
Obama administration, also as an important step in the path towards global disarmament.14 Russia, on
the other hand, is more dependent on its nuclear forces and “fears that continuing cuts to strategic
force levels could eventually threaten strategic stability and that the United States might pursue
additional cuts with that very goal in mind.”15 These broader views about the strategic logic of arms
control will shape both sides’ positions on verification, given the way that it can be used as a
foundation for political arguments.
In addition to these state-level divisions about arms control and verification, there are also
divergences within countries and their political factions that are reflected in the views of stakeholders.
Each participant in the arms control negotiations is coming to the table with pre-existing perceptions
and preferences about arms control, shaped by their political allegiances and personal views. These
notions will shape their approach to verification and the emphasis they place on technical verification
needs. They also are constrained by the structural environment in which they interact, with one of the
variables defining that environment being the status of verification technologies. As will be discussed
later in this chapter, these dynamics have been analyzed from a theoretical perspective in existing
international relations literature, but these divisions can also be understood in more general terms.
Stakeholders can be placed on a continuum with respect to their attitudes about nuclear arms
control, spanning from stern opponents to ardent proponents. Actors at the two ends, representing
the extreme positions, operationalize verification arguments to convince those in the middle to

14 Aaron Miles, “Adaptive Warhead Limits for Further Progress on Strategic Arms Control,” Real Clear Defense,
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support their position on arms control. These dynamics exist both at the national level and on the
international stage. Outcomes in verification debates emerge partially as a result of these interactions,
as well as due to genuine technical questions and concerns, which shows how the political and
technical dimensions of verification dimensions intersect.

IV.

Literature Review

The previous discussion establishes how verification technologies operate both as a technical
asset and a political tool, which illuminates the complexity of their role in verification debates and in
the verification process itself. These observations can be placed in the context of existing political
science literature, where these dynamics have been studied from a more theoretical perspective. The
focus in the following discussion will be on two theoretical frameworks, developed by Nancy
Gallagher and Geoffrey Herrera. Gallagher’s framework offers a way of understanding the dynamics
of verification debates using a two-level game that has been adapted to involve the influence that the
worldviews and identities of the involved stakeholders have on the debates. The framework’s
conventional understanding of technology as an exogenous variable that aligns with most system-level
theories, however, leaves little space for examining the independent effect that emerging verification
technologies could have in influencing verification debates. Thus, Gallagher’s framework can be
complemented and expanded by bringing in insights from Geoffrey Herrera’s analytical approach to
understanding the relationship between technology and international politics. Herrera’s framework
conceptualizes technology as an endogenous structural variable in the international system that is
interdependent of the dynamics of international politics. Integrating Gallagher and Herrera’s
approaches will provide an insightful lens for understanding how and why verification technologies
influence the politics of verification, and how the development of new verification technologies can
contribute to future arms control prospects.
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i.

Modeling Verification Debates as Two-Level Games

Gallagher’s The Politics of Verification is one of the seminal works on the political dimensions of
verification debates. The framework she develops can be used to conceptualize how the different
stakeholders involved in verification debates enter the negotiations with pre-existing interests and
ideas, and how these perceptions influence their behavior and decision-making processes. Gallagher’s
framework conceptualizes the politics of verification as a two-level game that is played both at the
international and domestic levels, by stakeholders that can be defined as one of three ideal types: arms
control opponents, arms control proponents, and cautious cooperators. Importantly, the framework
illuminates that debates about verification are not only an epiphenomenon linked to nuclear arms
control negotiations. Instead, the politics of verification is a process that independently influences the
verification decisions that are made and can ultimately make or break agreement on arms control
efforts.
The first principles of each ideal type qualify the importance that players in that category place
on verification technologies. Arms control opponents, for example, see verification technologies from
a competitive perspective where the development of verification capabilities can be important for
seeking “a verification regime that maximizes their own monitoring capabilities, denies the other side
access to sensitive information, and preserves their autonomy to act and judge others in ways that suit
their competitive goals.”16 For cautious cooperators, verification technology can become a critical
variable in shifting the costs and benefits of cooperation enough to make agreement possible.17 Their
views align with the arguments that verification helps in assuring states that violations will be detected,
provides deterrence against cheating, assures that the benefits of cooperation will be reaped, and can
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promote domestic support for arms control by allowing leaders to use these arguments in political
debates.18 For arms control advocates, the significance of verification technologies again declines, as
they see states’ security objectives as fundamentally compatible and compliance as a logical outcome.
A minimum level of verification is needed to facilitate cooperation, and anything above it can serve
to “promote international openness, strengthen international organizations, and democratize security
policy in countries whose civilian oversight of military decisions is weak.”19
Gallagher argues that debates about verification are a meaningful dimension of nuclear arms
control negotiations, and cannot be simplified into the frameworks contained in most literature on
verification. More optimistic traditional frameworks argue that verification can be used a tool to
incentivize compliance and deter cheating, thus decreasing the costs and risks of arms control
agreements and changing state calculus in international negotiations. More pessimistic perspectives do
not grant verification an independent effect in making cooperation possible, but instead see it as a
mechanism of sabotaging negotiations, gaining political ground, or otherwise being an
“epiphenomenon” of arms control negotiations.20 Neither of these views conceptualize the complexity
of verification debates in their true form. Gallagher proposes a framework that accommodates the
divergent stakeholders involved in verification debates and who employ varying strategies to pursue
their preferred policy path. The solution is not to depoliticize verification debates, but rather to
embrace the interconnected technical and political nature of verification arguments.
Gallagher lays out a modified two-level game theoretic model that incorporates both the
domestic and systemic levels of analysis to analyze the dynamics of verification debates. Two-level
games were originally conceptualized by Robert Putnam in “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the
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Logic of Two-Level Games,” which provides a framework for analyzing the causal relationship
between domestic and international factors in determining the outcomes of international
negotiations.21 This framework is highly applicable to verification negotiations, which are influenced
by the perspectives of domestic constituencies as well as the positions of the other states at the
negotiating table. A fuller description of two-level games is available in Putnam’s paper and in
subsequent work on the topic, as the focus here is on how Gallagher modifies the game to fit the
context of verification debates.
Gallagher modifies the traditional two-level game framework to the context of examining and
explaining the verification arguments made during arms control negotiations. The traditional
formulation of the two-level game focuses on players’ interests as a basis for their preferred outcomes
and most often considers these interests to be constant over time.22 Gallagher argues that in debates
about verification, it is also essential to consider the role that ideas, worldviews, and myths have in
shaping choices about verification arguments.23 These factors, together with interests and technical
realities, shape verification arguments and positions that are composed of both substantive and
strategic components. These modifications, which are rooted in assumptions from the English School
of international relations, help explain why certain verification arguments are operationalized by
certain actors during negotiations. The debate among the three groups that Gallagher defines is parallel
to the central dialogue in international relations theory on the possibilities of international
cooperation.24 The central question is whether verification could reconstruct state behavior such that
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durable cooperation would become possible in the absence of transnational enforcement mechanisms.
These interactions are at the core of Gallagher’s view of the politics of verification:
Conceptualizing the structure of verification arguments as a two-level game suggests that the causal
arrows flow in both directions. Instead of using domestic politics solely to account for national interests
or using system-level factors just to explain the outcome of internal policy debates, this approach
assumes that national leaders have their own preferences but are simultaneously constrained by what
other states will negotiate and what constituents will ratify. Here, the structure of the game is determined
by the mix of common and conflicting interests and the allocation of power among national
representatives at the negotiating table; it is also determined by the configuration of preferences and the
decision-making rules of each participating state. 25

Gallagher’s framework provides an important foundation for understanding how the
dynamics of verification negotiations operate through the interactions of the different types of
stakeholders. The focus of her analysis is confined within these interactive dynamics, with the
structural negotiations environment providing the backdrop for these interactions. This framing,
however, leaves out the consideration of the independent effects that changes in the structural
negotiations environment can have on the negotiation interactions. One of these structural variables
is technology, which is incorporated into Gallagher’s framework only as an objective variable that
shapes the preferences of each of the three ideal types.
ii.

The Role of Technology in Verification Debates

Gallagher’s understanding of verification technologies as an objective, constant variable is
aligned with the view embedded in many system-level theories. While Gallagher follows the English
School, similar views are associated with neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist views of
international relations. Technology is not seen as a component of the international system that can
foster change from within, but rather seen as an exogenous variable.26 My intention is to reverse this
view and examine the role that verification technologies play as an endogenous and independent
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variable in the two-level framework that Gallagher has formulated. I argue that verification
technologies can be understood as a structural variable both at the domestic and international levels,
with the power to shape the interactions and the dynamics of negotiations at both levels. Verification
technologies do not only create a passive technical environment for the negotiations – rather, state
leaders and institutions can make conscious and active decision to develop certain verification
capabilities. The successful development of these capabilities will result in structural shifts in the
negotiations environment, such that the players are forced to reformulate their arguments and
positions.
Turning this framing around and making structural variables the focus of analysis can provide
critical insights to the dynamics that Gallagher describes in her framework. This shift in perspectives
can be approached with the framework that Geoffrey Herrera provides in Technology and International
Transformation. He conceptualizes technology as an endogenous structural variable that can have
independent effects on interaction dynamics in the international system, which challenges traditional
representations of technology as an exogenous, passive variable. Making this conceptual shift will
allow a more nuanced understanding of how technology and international politics intertwine.
Geoffrey Herrera’ Technology and International Transformation provides a theoretical foundation
for developing the argument above.27 He challenges the traditional view of technology as an external
force and conceptualizes technology as an endogenous structural variable to the system.28 His
analytical framework draws from the classic essay “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” by Langdon Winner,
which was a part of an emerging dialogue on what can be called the theory of technological politics.29
Winner examines how technologies have political effects through two mechanisms, resolving
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arguments and organizing power and authority, which supports an understanding of technology as a
political force: “Rather than insist that we immediately reduce everything to the interplay of social
forces, it suggests that we pay attention to the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of
those characteristics. [This] perspective identifies certain technologies as political phenomena in their
own right.”30
Herrera places this argument in the context of structural theories in international relations,
which share a general understanding of the definition of structure. Kenneth Waltz, for example,
“defined system as being composed of units and their interactions – the interactions forming the
structure of the system.”31 Thus, his conceptualization of the international system includes states as
the primary units, anarchy as the ordering principle of their interactions, and the distribution of power
between them as the structure of the system.32 A more general definition of structure, however, can
be drawn from Waltz’s ideas, independent of realist assumptions and balance of power: “A political
structure is akin to a field of forces in physics: Interactions within a field have properties different
from those they would have if they occurred outside of it, and as the field affects the objects, so the
objects affect the field.”33
Herrera argues that bringing the sources of change in the international system to within the
system itself, as one of its structural components, can be accommodated by system-level theories. This
allows him to conceptualize technology as one of the international system’s structural components
and understand the relationship between technology and international politics as “fundamental and
mutually constitutive.”34 This departs from conceptualizing technology in simply physical terms,
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explaining how this variable interacts with international politics: “Technology is part of the structure
of international politics; international politics is one of the factors governing technological change.
Together they mutually constitute complex sociotechnical systems that are political at their core.”35
Herrera’s discussion focuses on the unit of analysis of sociotechnical systems, which are
comprised of “a complex of machines, operators, procedures and rules, and social institutions for
governing them,” with the definition referring specifically to technologies that are large in their scale
and scope.36 Herrera’s understanding of the relationship between sociotechnical systems and
international politics can be scaled to understanding the relationship between verification technologies
and the politics of verification. His understanding of technology’s role in international politics aligns
with how verification technologies relate to the politics of verification – as a structural variable that
plays an active, rather than passive, role in influencing the two-level game of verification politics. At
the same time, the evolution of verification technologies is shaped by the politics of verification, as
decisions over which technologies to develop are inherently political. With respect to scale, while
verification technologies are not as expansive in scope as the technologies that are usually understood
as sociotechnical systems, their conceptualization as such is valid in the context of verification politics.
Verification technologies encompass not only physical equipment and systems, but also the
understandings that states develop regarding specific verification technologies and approaches; the
protocols that define their use in on-site inspections or other circumstances; and their
institutionalization in arms control agreements and treaties. Thus, verification technologies can be
35
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associated with both material and social dimensions, aligned with the definition of sociotechnical
systems.
The critical component of Herrera’s analysis with respect to verification technologies is his
discussion of the ability of technology to shape the interaction capacity of the international system. In
concrete terms, technology influences interaction capacity by being able to “lock in certain political
possibilities and lock others out.”37 First, technology can create new options for action by helping
“social actors obtain preexisting goals that the prior material environment had made impossible or
near impossible.”38 In addition, “they can inspire social actors to imagine new goals that had not
occurred to them before the change in the material environment.”39 Second, they can shape the
material environment such that certain behaviors, actions, or arguments become limited or impossible.
Technology can create “facts on the ground” or reform social or political organization in states, which
then influences the options available for state actors.40
These mechanics of changing interaction capacity apply to verification technologies at both
the technical and political levels. Once a certain technological verification capability has been
introduced into the international community at large, the interaction capacity of the system shifts.
First, new verification capabilities can expand the options for action both politically and technically.
As new verification technologies are created, the options for arms control treaty architecture are
expanded, since something that used to be out of reach for monitoring capabilities becomes now
possible to detect. This alters the calculations of all stakeholders on the negotiating table about their
capacity to detect cheating. This effect is reverberated at the rhetorical level, as the novel verification
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capacities also make new arguments available to the negotiators, particularly for arms control
proponents. The legitimacy of their arguments about the verifiability of the treaty provisions are
increased, enhancing their ability to sway the cautious cooperators towards supporting the arms
control agreement.
Second, in addition to increasing options for action, new verification technologies can also
create limitations for behavior. Again, this relates both to technical and rhetorical dimensions. The
new verification capability may render a certain form of cheating impossible or very easily detectable,
which makes previous arguments about the unverifiability of the agreement lose their strength. While
those opposing the arms control agreement might still choose to imagine obscure cheating scenarios
within the new limits of verification capabilities – and are quite likely to, since these have proven
successful strategies in the past – the modified claims lose legitimacy in the eyes of the other
stakeholders in the negotiations. Arms control proponents can call their bluff, or show that the
potential cheating scenario would have no military significance, which would help them convince the
undecided segment to support their positions. Again, it is critical to recognize that this verification
debate is taking place within a greater political context, but the point is that in tiebreaker situations,
the strength and legitimacy of verification arguments matter. If the new verification capabilities shift
these two variables, then the dynamics of the negotiations are different than if those novel verification
technologies had not been developed.
Another important dimension of Herrera’s conceptualization of technology is his critique of
both deterministic and social constructivist understandings of technology in the existing literature on
the history and philosophy of technology.41 Deterministic viewpoints understand technology to be

41 In the determinist approach, promoted by neorealism and often liberalism, technology is seen as an exogenous
variable that can influence politics, but its development is shaped by apolitical factors. In neorealism, for example,
military technologies are seen as factors that define a state’s military capabilities, and the acquisition of a new technology
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above politics with respect to its development, to create political effects that are predictable and
definable, and to require no political analysis for understanding its effects on society.42 In terms of
international relations, “the underlying technological environment determines the nature of political
authority or, more precisely, the institutions of security provision.”43 Social constructionism challenges
this deterministic view of technology’s impact and emphasizes the role that human agency, politics,
and economics have in facilitating its role in society. The implication of understanding technology as
a social construct is to say that social and political processes shape the way that humans interpret any
given technology, which then gives rise to its significance and impact.44 Herrera argues that both
determinism and social constructionism are too extreme in their interpretations of technology, with
the truth being something in between. Technology is “both a social product and an important
independent force because it confronts actors as a real resource or impediment.”45
In the context of verification technologies, this argument adds substance to Gallagher’s
framework of the politics of verification and adds to how the framework accounts for the influence
of verification technologies. Changes in the available verification capabilities cannot single-handedly
make an arms control agreement possible, in the absence of political will – but they can change the
likelihood of an agreement by shifting the dynamics of the negotiations. Their impact is not only
channeled through the rhetorical level, in the arguments that are made about verification – they also
actively and physically influence the choices and arguments that are available to the different
stakeholders. This simultaneous influence of verification technologies in defining the physical
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capabilities and concrete mechanisms by which actors can monitor and verify arms control
agreements, and in shaping the argumentation dynamics of the involved actors, characterizes their role
as an independent structural variable. The impact of verification technologies is neither purely
deterministic or socially constructed, but a combination of the two.

V.

Emerging Verification Capabilities

Linking Gallagher and Herrera’s theoretical frameworks together provides a gateway for
expanding the analysis of the role that verification technology plays in the politics of verification. It is
possible to proceed beyond simple visions of verification technologies as the panacea for resolving
verification debates, or the reverse, of understanding verification decisions as purely political,
completely isolated from technological development. Gallagher and Herrera’s frameworks create a
foundation for conceptualizing verification technologies both as an independent and dependent
variable and provide a more theoretical footing for the two feedback loop models. This examination
now allows for a sharper analysis of how innovations in verification technologies and mechanisms can
shift the politics of verification and impact the future prospects for arms control.
One of the important implications of the dynamic interactions between verification
technologies and politics is that new verification capabilities can either promote cooperation or
intensify competition, depending on what their attributes are and how those attributes are
operationalized in the politics of verification. Even if a verification technology is developed with the
intention that it will expand the opportunities for verification and enhance the prospects for arms
control agreements, there is a risk that the attributes of the technology can be used against this
purpose, for example if it has the possibility of providing asymmetric backdoor advantages for the
verifier or another party. Thus, in order for the verification technology to serve its intended purpose
and be able to foster trust, there has to be verification of the verification technology itself – controlling
33

the properties of the new capabilities such that no counterproductive side effects will emerge.
Ultimately, new tools in the verification toolbox can serve as generic multipliers, either enhancing the
likelihood of collaboration, or increasing the chances of competition. Going back to Gallagher’s
framework, the balance of these dynamics depends on what strategies and arguments are used by arms
control opponents and proponents, and how they can use verification capabilities in advancing their
political position.
One particular debate, about the tradeoffs between secrecy and transparency in verification,
has stirred verification negotiations continuously and connects strongly to the question of how novel
verification technologies shape interaction capacity in the politics of verification. In all forms of arms
control agreements, states must determine what their interests are in maintaining secrecy about their
capabilities, and collaborating transparently with other nations involved in the treaty. Balancing these
two interests determines the ways in which the states decide to interact and provide information about
their adherence to the treaty provisions.
This verification issue is particularly critical to limitations about warheads, where the host state
would need to prove to the verifier that they are truly decreasing their arsenals according to the treaty
provisions, for example by demonstrating that they are dismantling authentic nuclear warheads, but
doing so without revealing sensitive or classified information about the warheads or their design. The
severity of this tradeoff is tied into states’ interaction capacity – how much they are able to
communicate in the verification process before hitting their hard limits on secrecy – which depends
on the nature of the verification technologies available. If it is possible to develop technologies that
ameliorate this tradeoff, such that an increase in transparency does not lead to a proportional sacrifice
in secrecy, then these technologies would result in an increase in the interaction capacity of the
international system.
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The effort to develop verification approaches that do this has been ongoing since the early
days of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, but only in the past decades have there been concrete
successes. The next chapters will outline the history of these development efforts, as well as focus on
a specific category of technologies conceived in the past few years that represent the newest generation
of these efforts. Before going in depth in describing these verification approaches, it is critical to
understand how they fit into the greater context of the politics of arms control, and why is it important
to invest in developing these verification capabilities. This can be done by framing this verification
issue within the discussion of this chapter.
As Gallagher’s framework illustrates, each participant in the arms control negotiations is
coming to the table with pre-existing perceptions and preferences about arms control. These notions
will shape their views about verification and the emphasis they place on technical verification needs.
On the other hand, they are constrained by the structural environment in which they interact, with
one of the variables defining that environment being the status of verification technologies. Aligned
with Herrera’s conceptualization of technology as an endogenous structural variable to the
international system, it is possible to imagine verification technologies as something that can be
actively and deliberately shaped by the political actors involved in negotiations. The changes in the
nature and quality of verification technologies will consequently shape the dynamics of the verification
debates.
In the specific context of warhead limitations and the verification of these limitations, technical
verification capabilities are currently the limiting factor that constrain treaty architecture and the factor
that gives a comparative advantage to those who oppose agreements that pose numerical restrictions.
Current verification mechanisms focus on monitoring delivery vehicles, as they are sufficiently large
for detection by national technical means and are also compatible with the on-site inspection
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procedures in use.46 These verification approaches, however, pose severe limitations for future
disarmament prospects and agreements that expand beyond the status quo – those that address much
lower numbers of warheads, involve new categories of nuclear weapons, and engage states that have
very little experience in arms control.
An illustrative example of the restricted nature of the existing warhead limitation strategies can
be drawn from the New START counting rules, applied to China’s nuclear arsenal. Under New
START counting rules, China has virtually no treaty-accountable nuclear weapons, because the treaty
only considers warheads that are affiliated with operationally deployed strategic delivery systems. 47
Since China only mounts its warheads with delivery systems for testing purposes, and at other times
keeps them separate, the approach used in New START has little practical use as a foundation for
agreements that limit China’s nuclear weapons. This insight applies to every other nuclear weapons
state other than the United States and Russia, who are the only states who keep their warheads
deployed and operational.48
The verification needs in agreements that intend to involve one of the three parameters above
– lower arsenals, other warhead categories, and new states – are impossible using current technical
verification capabilities, since they require authenticating individual warheads. The premise here is that
states would want to ensure that their opponents’ reductions are genuine, with the fear that the other

National technical means refer to state-controlled intelligence capabilities aimed at detecting noncompliance,
including imaging reconnaissance satellites, aircraft radars and optical systems, sea- and ground-based radar and antenna
systems, radio-technical reconnaissance, and many other classified mechanisms. (Source: Congress of the United States,
“Verification Technologies: Measures for Monitoring Compliance with the START Treaty,” Office of Technology
Assessment, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_2/DATA/1990/9029.PDF; also William Burr, “The
Secret History of The ABM Treaty, 1969-1972,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 60, November 8,
2001, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB60/index2.html.)
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side would be dismantling ‘blanks’ and hiding the authentic warheads to a covert storage facility. While
it is possible to agree on further warhead reductions without these authentication protocols, either
using START-type counting rules or even without any verification provisions, as with SORT, it is
unlikely that this would be politically acceptable. Especially in the ‘hardest’ cases, such as in
disarmament agreements between India and Pakistan, the level of mistrust is likely to be so high that
the countries will pursue the strictest possible verification provisions. 49 Under these conditions, the
authentication of warheads becomes a political necessity, but the current verification capabilities do
not make this technically possible without revealing information about the characteristics of the
warheads themselves – which in turn would hit another barrier of political unacceptability.
The emergence of novel verification capabilities, however, can transform the situation both
politically and technically. The verification approaches discussed in a following chapter, which employ
physical cryptographic proofs in a high-security authentication protocol, or ‘zero-knowledge
verification’, would provide a technical capacity that meets the most rigorous demands that
policymakers could make. These verification approaches would be a significant technical asset for
arms control treaty architecture, because they would allow addressing new categories of warheads that
were previously unattainable, by creating the ability to authenticate and track individual warheads, and
re-authenticate them during their movement in the dismantlement process. On the political side, the
development of these new verification approaches would change the arguments made both by arms
control opponents and proponents. They eliminate the technical argument that warhead limitations
cannot be verified with a high level of accuracy, or that the verification process reveals sensitive
information which would be a national security threat. Thus, the existence of these technologies would

49 Of course, the question here is how the states could have come to an agreement under these conditions, but that is
outside the scope of analysis here. One possibility would be an internationally enforced disarmament treaty, for example,
but also voluntary agreements after the relations between the states have improved, but not sufficiently to overcome the
long-standing mistrust between the countries.
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be an essential asset for disarmament negotiators, as it constrains the arguments and strategies that are
available to the involved stakeholders, builds trust in the verification process, and helps gain support
for the arms control efforts within domestic constituencies.
As has been addressed in this chapter previously, however, the dynamic interactions between
the technical and political dimensions make the impact of novel verification capabilities unpredictable.
Verification is never perfect, as the capabilities of verification technologies are always constrained in
one way or another.50 The specific issues and limitations relating to zero-knowledge verification
approaches will be discussed in a later chapter, but several challenges are inherently connected to these
mechanisms. The critical question is, then, how policymakers and negotiations – especially in an
international context – will assess the fundamental uncertainties relating to these and other verification
technologies. The traditional way to assess verification provisions is to focus on their ability to detect
militarily significant violations, but this standard is very subjective and liable to political maneuvering.51
The answer to the question of how to deal with the imperfection of verification technologies
has two components – one relating to the dissemination of information about the technologies
themselves, and another focusing on the context in which verification negotiations take place. The
first dimension has been mentioned previously in this chapter, which is that there is a need to verify
the verification technologies themselves. More specifically, certification is the process by which the
host state verifies the technical equipment, whereas authentication is the parallel process from the
inspector side.52 The easier that these two functions are to do, the easier it is to inform the
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policymakers about the technical verification capabilities and build trust around the new verification
capabilities.
The second component is that the process of negotiating verification provisions, as well as
the actual implementation of verification protocols, involves iterated relationships that persist over
time. This is true between policymakers and the technical verification community, as well as at the
international level in the negotiations between states. These iterated interactions are visible in the
feedback loops described earlier. Robert Axelrod has discussed the significance of iterated
relationships in game theoretic terms, arguing that the strategy of tit for tat – “starting with
cooperation, and thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous move” – is the best option
for sustaining cooperative behavior between actors.53 One of his observations is that reciprocity
becomes more effective when interactions are decomposed, or take place in smaller increments.54 In
the context of arms control, this is a critical factor that can help overcome imperfect verification,
which is essentially an issue of not knowing whether the partner adhered to their commitments in past
moves or not:
Of course, a major question in arms control is whether each side can, in fact, know what the other side
actually did on the previous move – whether they cooperated by fulfilling their obligations or defected
by cheating. But for any given degree of confidence in each side’s ability to detect cheating, having many
small steps will help promote cooperation as compared to having just a few big steps. Decomposing
the interaction promotes the stability of cooperation by making the gains from cheating on the current
move that much less important relative to the gains from potential mutual cooperation on later moves. 55

Yet, when Axelrod’s game is run under conditions of uncertainty due to “moderate error in
perception,” which can result from random noise, systematic misperception, or other factors, the
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strategy of reciprocity still remains the best option for the players.56 What Axelrod has observed in
game theoretic terms – that under iterated interaction dynamics, “cooperation can get started and
prove stable in situations which otherwise appear extraordinarily unpromising” – is also generalizable
to human affairs and international relations at large, including nuclear disarmament efforts.57
Ultimately, the combination of the gradual development in verification capabilities and the
facilitation by iterative relationships both within and between states could bring states to the required
threshold of trust that is needed for disarmament, despite the inherent imperfectness of verification.
The situation has analogy to Zeno’s Paradox, as formulated by Aristotle:
In a race, the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since the pursuer must first reach the
point whence the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold a lead. 58

Verification negotiations can be understood as a race of sorts, where the ‘slower’ party is trying
to develop verification technologies that allow them to catch up to the ‘faster’ party, or those who
always ask for stricter barriers against cheating and create new possibilities for deception. In a sense,
this is a competition between trust and mistrust, with technological capabilities trying to bridge the
gap to the required level of confidence and trust in verification. Axelrod’s observations, however,
provide the missing piece here – iterated relationships, jointly with progressive technological
development, will allow enough trust to be accrued. At that critical point, the political incentive to
create the agreement will outweigh the risk of being deceived by the other side. This idea aligns with
the mathematical solution to Zeno’s paradox of motion, which is that the sum of an infinite series
(the steps of the quicker runner to catch up to the slower one) can be finite, if the series is convergent
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– meaning that the terms get progressively smaller.59 Similarly, Axelrod argues that decomposing a
relationship into smaller pieces of interaction makes the difference between cooperation and
competition.
To put this in the specific context of warhead verification, the objective of the verification
technologies under development is not to become a panacea that solves perfectly the tradeoff between
secrecy and transparency, but to elevate it to a level that is acceptable to states and that provides
sufficient level of trust with respect to both concerns. At some point, determined by the balance of
political interests, these verification capabilities will reach a critical threshold that allows states to be
content with the verification capabilities that have been developed. Importantly, however, this
threshold level is transient and may even be unknown to the negotiators themselves. The implication
is that the ongoing research must set the standards they are pursuing at the highest possible level, to
be sufficient for even the hardest cases and conditions.
While I will provide a historical context for this verification challenge in the following chapter,
I want to emphasize that the purpose of this thesis is not to be a historical, de post facto examination of
the issue. The debate about the future of arms control persists, even if we may be in a moment of
slowdown, with the technological development process being pursued in national laboratories,
academic institutions, and multilateral endeavors. My purpose is to contribute to these ongoing
dynamics and bring attention to the fact that by taking active agency in developing novel verification
capabilities, we have the power to shape the prospects of future agreements to limit nuclear weapons.
The verification approaches I describe in this thesis may never be fully implemented in an arms control
treaty, but I argue that they are important regardless – both for opening the dialogue on new treaty
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architecture options, as well as shaping the political dynamics of the treaty negotiations themselves, as
this chapter has shown.

42

2. Past Verification Approaches
I.

Introduction

Past disarmament regimes have taken different approaches to controlling nuclear arms, from
limiting the testing of these weapons to reducing their numbers.60 All of these measures have contained
some provisions for verification, through different mechanists and at varying levels of intensity.61
Overall, the evolution of the agreed verification provisions reflects a trend towards more complexity,
in terms of the requirements for effective verification and the monitoring technologies employed to
meet these requirements.62 As was discussed in the previous chapter, however, the political dynamics
of the verification negotiations is a more complicated story than simply defining the requirements for
verification and then creating technologies to fulfill them. While these political dynamics are an
essential part in understanding how verification decisions are made, the following discussion on the
history of disarmament treaty verification also emphasizes how the availability of verification
technologies determine the limits of possibility for decision-makers when making judgments about
the requirements of the verification process.
Past nuclear arms reductions have been pursued mainly in the context of the United States
and Russia, and, earlier, the Soviet Union. These bilateral disarmament efforts started with the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II in 1972 and 1979, respectively, at the peak of the
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Cold War.63 These were followed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was signed in
1972, and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987.64 After the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia continued these arms reduction efforts through the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), with the first agreement being made in 1991 and the second
in 1993.65 Following this, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) was signed in 2002 and
the New START in 2011.66 Several unique factors relating to the nature of U.S.-Russia bilateral
relations and the states’ nuclear capabilities have made this cooperation possible and enabled the states
to come to an agreement on how these disarmament efforts can be verified.

Figure 2.1. Source: Arms Control Association, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,”
updated January 2017, available online from
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.
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In these agreements, the tension between intrusiveness and confidentiality has been
circumvented by not defining warheads themselves as the treaty-accountable item, but rather focusing
on their delivery vehicles and launchers.67 Authenticating reductions in these larger systems requires
less intrusive verification protocols, as they only require negative verification of the absence of
warheads beyond the maximum number agreed in the treaty.68 The accounting system is designed such
that each delivery vehicle has a specified number of attributed warheads and the verification protocol
aims to establish that there are no deployed warheads beyond this. This can be contrasted with positive
verification, which would entail verifying that a nuclear warhead is truly what it is stated to be, possibly
even ensuring that it is of the correct type. In addition, these past treaties were very conservative in
terms of allowing access to territory or collecting information about other military activities.69
The chapter outlines the past trajectory of nuclear verification provisions, by first analyzing
disarmament agreements made in the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russia context, then explaining the unique
characteristics of disarmament between the two countries and identifying challenges that are likely to
arise in a multilateral context, and then exploring past verification efforts carried out internationally.
The chapter starts by exploring the SALT era, where verification was focused on national technical
means. Next, the chapter focuses on the INF Treaty, which contained several innovations in
verification, including radiological measurements and on-site inspections. After this, the focus is on
the START era – including START I, which employed many of the verification mechanisms used in
the INF Treaty; START II, which was not ratified; SORT, which did not contain verification
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provisions; and finally, New START, which intended to simplify the original START treaty’s
verification provisions without losing their robustness.
After explaining this historical trajectory, the chapter illustrates why the verification choices
made in these past treaties were possible in the specific U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Russia context. After this,
the focus is on the factors that will make future disarmament efforts fundamentally different. Next,
the chapter explores the few concrete experiences that the international community has had in
verification, which are limited to verifying the dismantlement of nuclear programs in Iraq, South
Africa, and Libya. In each of the three cases, it is highlighted how concerns about proliferationsensitive information shaped the structure of the verification programs and how concerns about
legitimacy emerged.

II.

The SALT Era

The first SALT negotiations resulted in the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms and the
ABM Treaty, which were aimed at limiting both offensive and defensive strategic systems and
stabilizing the accelerating arms race between the two states.70 Under SALT I, both sides refrained
from producing new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) silos.71 It also enforced limits on the number of SLBM launch tubes and SLBMcapable submarines.72 The treaty was limited in its ability to contain nuclear arms buildup, however,
as it did not limit the actual number of deployed warheads. Both states could increase their nuclear
capabilities through acquiring more strategic bombers, which the treaty did not control, or deploying
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ballistic missiles carrying several warheads instead of one (multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles, MIRVs) in the allowed number of ICBMs and SLBMs.73 The ABM treaty limited the strategic
missile defenses of both states to 200, and later 100, interceptors.74
Concerns about verification were a key factor in both the SALT I and ABM Treaty
negotiations, significantly influencing the ultimate contents of the agreed treaties.75 For the ABM
Treaty, the political preference for both sides would have been to allow nationwide ABM deployments,
but the treaty negotiations concluded with permitting only one local ABM system. 76 If a nationwide
radar system would have been permissible, it would have been exceedingly difficult for both sides to
verify the true extent of the system.77 Similarly, the political incentives would have been in place to
expand the SALT I limitations to missiles and missile characteristics, but required measures for
verification would have been unacceptable due to their intrusiveness.78 In the end, national technical
means of verification (NTM) were agreed to as the key verification mechanism in the treaties, which
refer to state-controlled intelligence capabilities aimed at detecting noncompliance.79 This also
included non-interference with the other state’s intelligence collection and verification efforts.80
The SALT II agreement intended to address some of the systems that SALT I had left
untouched, particularly MIRVs, as well as further limit the number of delivery vehicles and limit
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nuclear weapons development.81 Again, verification became a key issue, as concerns about Soviet
cheating in SALT I made America extremely sensitive about verification and intent on ensuring airtight
protocols.82 For example, limiting MIRVs would require both sides to be able to distinguish between
MIRVed and un-MIRVed missile launchers.83 Ultimately, SALT II verification was also based on
NTM. The treaty contained further provisions for not obstructing the other state’s NTM, including
the collection of electronic signals (telemetry) and use of photo-reconnaissance satellites.84 The ability
to collect telemetry information, which is generated during missile flight tests and contains details
about weapon function, was a key concern for the states, as the treaty included limitations on weapons
characteristics.85 The issue of encryption of telemetry information, however, remained tense
throughout and beyond the negotiations, as the two sides had divided opinions of the importance of
this verification mechanism.86 SALT II also included provisions for ensuring the distinguishability of
different weapons types through “externally observable differences” or “functionally-related
observable differences” that could be detected by NTM.87 Questions about verification confidence
were a partial reason, alongside greater geopolitical concerns such as the Soviet invasion of
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Afghanistan, that led the Carter administration to turn its back on the agreement and ask the Senate
not to ratify the treaty.88

III.

The INF Treaty

As disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued later
in the 1980s, increasing interest emerged in novel forms of verification. The instrumentation for these
approaches, which included on-site inspections and other more intrusive verification mechanisms,
would need to be developed to make the verification provisions possible. The key motivation to
acquire these verification capabilities was further limitations on ballistic missiles that carried multiple
warheads, which had only been verified through NTM in the SALT treaties. These missiles may not
carry the maximum number of warheads that their structure would allow, but instead the loadout
could include penetration aids, telemetry systems, or other non-nuclear objects.89 The national
laboratories in the United States engaged several research projects to understand how this
authentication task could be executed, considering the key limiting factors that the verification process
would encounter. One of the key concerns was protecting sensitive and classified design information,
which would be at risk during the measurement process.
These new verification measures were implemented in the INF Treaty, which was
unprecedented in its verification scope insofar as it included on-site inspections and data exchanges
for the first time.90 The INF Treaty contained a provision for being able to distinguish the treatyaccountable SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the non-limited SS-25 intercontinental
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ballistic missiles. 91 The challenge was that the missile types used the same first stages, including engines
and fuel tanks, and were indistinguishable based on external characteristics.92 As the verification
provisions didn’t allow inspection access to the missiles themselves, radiological measurements were
agreed on as a proxy measure of the missiles’ internal structure. Two approaches were approved –
distinguishing between the radiological “fingerprints” of the missiles in their normal loadouts, and
measuring radiographically the external structural features of the missiles, including length.93 In
determining the fingerprint of a particular missile, a simple neutron detector would be used to measure
neutron count rates at pre-selected points surrounding the warhead, which had been found to enable
their accurate differentiation.94
The experiences in developing and negotiating the INF verification provisions motivated
further research into warhead-focused verification. The INF system was focused on differentiating
two specific types of missiles, but future arms reductions would involve a wide range of weapons
systems, possibly even individual warheads. In 1990, the national laboratories in the United States
engaged in a demonstration that highlighted how any feasible measurement approach would need to
be able to accommodate a range of weapons systems designs, which would create distinct radiation
fields indicative of their configurations.95 The verification system demonstrations at the Francis E.
Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming used the Peacekeeper missile (MX, LGM-118) as its model
system, as it doesn’t conform to the standard configuration of an axially symmetric design. 96 The
measurement systems tested in the demonstrations, based on circumferential gamma or neutron
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radiation scanning, revealed important challenges relating to environmental conditions and
measurement system optimization and engineering, but most importantly, to security. The information
generated in the tests would have been classified as Secret/Restricted Data (S/RD) and required the
inspectors to have very intrusive access to the missiles.97 These research efforts were made particularly
with the START negotiations in mind, but the U.S. national laboratories (and those in other states)
have continuously engaged in this type of research. One of the first such American experiments was
the Project Cloud Gap, which included Field Test 34 in 1967 that investigated the use of radiation
detection equipment in the context of dismantling nuclear weapons, and the extent to which classified
information would be at risk in this scenario.98

IV.

The START Era

Ultimately, the following START negotiations could not find a mutually agreeable way to
overcome the issue of classified information and succumbed to a warhead accounting system that did
not require specific individual counting of warheads. Instead, the treaty contained a complex
accounting system for the limit on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and for the total
number of warheads attributed to each of the delivery vehicles, including sub-limits.99 The warheads
were counted based on a warhead attribution number specific to each delivery vehicle, which are
determined based on telemetry data obtained through missile flight tests.100 Each delivery vehicle was
assumed to carry the maximum loadout of nuclear warheads, which then defined the upper limit for
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treaty-accountable warheads.101 This accounting, however, was only done on a theoretical basis and
did not necessarily reflect the true loadouts in each system. For example, the treaty attributed one
warhead to each non-LRNA heavy bomber, even though they have the capacity to carry multiple.102
Thus, START I verification protocols are only intended to ensure that these theoretical warhead limits
were not exceeded in any missile type, rather than establishing the exact number of warheads held by
each country.103
The furthest that START I went in terms of verification sophistication was the provision it
contained for the use of radiation detection equipment in a situation where a treaty partner would
want to confirm the non-nuclear nature of an object, container, or space.104 This was very similar to
the INF Treaty provision on the use of radiological measurements and relied on the same detector
technology.105 Under START I, a state had the right to authenticate the radiological signature of a
long-range-non-nuclear air-launched cruise missile, ensuring that it was not nuclear.106 The procedures
for using this equipment specified how the measurement system would be certified, controlled, and
used such that no sensitive information would be at risk.107 The treaty’s very limited on-site inspections
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did not allow the verification of the specific number of warheads in delivery vehicles, only that the
warhead limits and sub-limits were not exceeded.108
START II was a continuation and an addition to START I, maintaining the earlier treaty’s
provisions and building on its verification model, in addition to expanding it in certain dimensions.109
In START II, warheads were attributed to their delivery vehicle based on their true carrying capacity,
which addressed the inaccuracy in START I warhead counting.110 START II also contained new
verification provisions for observing SS-18 missile silo conversion, missile elimination, exhibitions, as
well as visual inspections of heavy bombers.111 START II never entered into force, however, due to
disagreements on U.S. ratification of the treaty and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.112
The New START Treaty was signed in 2010, after the expiration of START I in 2009 and the
negotiation of the SORT agreement, which contained no verification provisions.113 New START
continued the legacy of the verification systems implemented under START I, combining on-site
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inspections, exhibitions, data exchanges, unique identifiers, and national technical means.114 It
modified some of the complex provisions in the past system, but also introduced new measures to
ensure accurate accounting.115 These included unique identifier tags on missiles, their launchers, and
bombers, as well as notification protocols related to the movement of delivery vehicles.116 Most
importantly, the new accounting procedure involved counting individual warheads, as opposed to
following the strategy in START I of maximum loadouts specified for delivery vehicles.117 Under New
START, each state must define how many individual warheads each missile contains, and during
inspections, any of the missiles in the stockpile could be asked to be verified.118 As in START I, the
agreement allows for the use of radiation detection to confirm an object to be non-nuclear.
The verification mechanisms in the INF, START I and II, and New START started to
approach the issue of individual warhead verification. Importantly, however, the verification
provisions thus far have been a binary true/false measurement of the absence of a nuclear warhead.119
These agreements do not allow the use of radiation detection equipment to confirm an object to be
nuclear, let alone more specific information about warhead characteristics or configuration. 120 As
disarmament continues, this may become a key capability requirement for verification provisions,
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driven by the need to distinguish warheads or their components based on their type or characteristics,
not only their nuclear or non-nuclear nature.121

V.

Challenges of Multilateralization
i.

Uniqueness of U.S.-Russia Context

The U.S.-Russia context, and before that the U.S.-Soviet, has been unique in many respects,
which has facilitated disarmament despite the inability to count individual warheads and thus construct
treaties based on warhead limitations. The critical factor that has made this approach to treaty
architecture and verification possible is the vast size of the nuclear arsenals of both states. During the
Cold War, both manufactured tens of thousands of warheads, and even after several rounds of arms
reduction, still maintain over 1,550 deployed warheads.122 At this level of nuclear arsenals, both states
have a relatively high tolerance for the level of uncertainty contained in treaty verification provisions
– a significant diversion scenario threatening strategic stability would be much more than one
individual warhead.123 Thus, both the United States and Russia have been able to negotiate nuclear
arms reductions without the ability to fully verify each other’s warhead numbers.
Another important factor is that both states have extensive capabilities in national technical
means (NTM), including imaging reconnaissance satellites, aircraft radars and optical systems, sea- and
ground-based radar and antenna systems, radio-technical reconnaissance, and many other classified
mechanisms.124 This served as a critical confidence-building mechanism in the agreements between
the states. These capabilities are highly compatible with the reduction focus on delivery vehicles and
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launchers, as these large systems can be monitored through NTM.125 These capabilities are held highly
confidential, which ensures ambiguity about the specific detection abilities that each state has. 126 This
is an important factor that underlies their effectiveness as verification mechanisms. When neither state
is fully certain of partner capabilities in independent verification through NTM, they cannot design
around this form of verification, which is a concern in cooperative verification mechanisms that are
fully known to all sides of the agreement.127 States can also develop NTM capabilities such that they
form synergies with the cooperative monitoring measures and can thus enhance their confidence in
their ability to detect deception.128 Overall, the advanced NTM capabilities in both the United States
and Russia act as a backdrop for all disarmament treaties between the states.
The future of disarmament verification will look very different, whether in the context of
continued U.S.-Russia bilateral agreements or multilateral disarmament treaties, as none of the unique
characteristics of past verification efforts will hold true. First, when discussion concerns hundreds of
warheads and levels even below this, the tolerable margin of error diminishes. At these levels, verifying
and tracking each individual warhead will become critical. This also involves obtaining knowledge
about the type and status of a specific warhead and being able to re-authenticate these attributes in
later stages of the dismantlement process. Agreements at these levels will also involve new categories
of warheads and items, including non-deployed and non-strategic warheads and warhead
components.129
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At these levels, states will also want to have more certainty about the irreversibility of
reductions, which requires close monitoring of warheads in their elimination process. During the
START II negotiations, one of the concerns was that warheads removed from missiles and bombers
could simply be replaced with those remaining in storage, if relations between the states became
hostile.130 Future treaties, especially those also addressing warheads in storage, will need to be able to
ensure the irreversibility of warhead elimination with a high degree of confidence.131 One further
complexity is that states may want to reuse delivery vehicles for conventional weapons, which
highlights the significance of the irreversibility of the elimination of nuclear warheads, rather than
delivery systems’.132
Second, NTM verification will be unable to provide a sufficient level of confidence in
compliance under future disarmament agreements. The verification provisions in the New START
agreement already reduced reliance on NTM, particularly telemetry information.133 Telemetry was no
longer used as a basis for warhead calculations, as the treaty provisions involved actual accounting for
warheads and verifying them through on-site inspections.134 New START still contained provisions
for exchanging telemetry information on the basis of promoting openness and transparency. 135 In
future disarmament efforts, the role of NTM will shift further and continue losing its informational
significance. First, states other than the United States and Russia have very divergent capabilities and
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resources in NTM, from availability of collection capabilities, to ability to analyze the data effectively.
States with inferior capabilities would be highly opposed to agreeing on a verification approach that
would rely significantly on NTM, as they would not be sufficiently confident in their abilities to do
this. They would also be reluctant to leave the monitoring responsibilities to other states, without
independent means of assessing compliance. On the other hand, states with superior NTM capabilities
would be reluctant to share the collected information, if it compromised sensitive knowledge about
their collection capabilities and analysis methods.136 In future multilateral treaties, cooperative
verification measures must be able to provide sufficient confidence for all treaty partners independent
of states’ ability to confirm these compliance assessments with NTM.
ii.

Multilateral Verification

The bilateral U.S.-Soviet, or U.S.-Russia, disarmament agreements and their verification
provisions established the traditional paradigm for verification in nuclear arms control. Outside of this
context, there are only a handful of examples of stringent verification protocols being applied to arms
control and disarmament. The international community’s experiences are mainly limited to verifying
the dismantlement of nuclear programs in Iraq, South Africa, and Libya. Thus, the multilateralization
of disarmament beyond the U.S.-Russia context will also involve an important debate about what
international authority will carry out the verification mission. The following discussion on the three
cases highlights some of the challenges that multilateral verification has encountered in the past,
demonstrating challenges that can be expected to be encountered in some shape or form in future
cases of disarmament. Importantly, they reflect cases in which states have completely disarmed or
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dismantled their nascent nuclear weapons programs, but as was discussed at the beginning of this
chapter, the dynamics will be different in important ways if states disarm progressively.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the key international institution involved
in nuclear verification, mainly through its civilian safeguards implementation under the NPT, but also
through other efforts relating to nuclear safety and security. Information management under IAEA
safeguards provisions is very strict, as a majority of the information about a specific state’s civilian
nuclear materials and facilities is confidential between the state and the IAEA.137 The few selected
instances where the IAEA has been involved in military-related verification missions, however,
illustrate how the agency’s current capabilities are not set up for sensitive military environments.138 In
addition to significant concerns that states have about allowing access to some of their most critical
national security capabilities and facilities, verification in the military context has additional
confidentiality requirements mandated by Article I in the NTP. Under the article’s provisions, nuclear
weapons states are obligated “not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to
any recipient or in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state in the
manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon.”139 Allowing inspectors from non-nuclear weapons
states to analyze weapons design information during the verification mission, for example, could be
interpreted as a breach to this obligation, as it also extends to sharing proliferation-sensitive
information with multilateral entities.140
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iii.

The Case of Iraq

The first important case of international disarmament verification took place in Iraq, in the
aftermath of the First Gulf War, when Iraq accepted an international inspection and monitoring
regime to verify the dismantlement of its WMD program.141 The United Nations Special Commission
on Iraq (UNSCOM) was established in 1991 to implement the verification mission, which continued
until 1998, when Iraq ended its cooperation with the program.142 In 2002, inspections resumed under
the auspices of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which
contained even more stringent verification protocols.143 In both cases, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) partnered with the mission in the verification of Iraq’s nuclear activities.144 In
the first mission, the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) executed extensive monitoring
inspections to Iraqi weapons facilities, resulting in the handover and removal of different equipment
related to nuclear weapons development.145 Joint IAEA/UNSCOM teams also conducted inspections
at “capable” sites, including analysis of documents and procurement information.146 In addition to onsite inspections, the group also used interviews, environmental sampling, and aerial radiometric
surveys as a means of collecting information about the country’s nuclear activities and adopted new
instruments as the mission continued. 147
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One of NMG’s responsibilities was confirming the declarations related to the destruction of
Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program.148 In the first phase, the NMG inspected three sites with
sub-surface sensing technologies, “provided and implemented by a supporting member State,” which
confirmed the identity and location of buried metallic items.149 In the second phase, the inspection
mission was expanded to nine other sites. The information obtained in these inspections was
compared against Iraq’s “Full, Final and Complete Declaration” and its revisions, which the state had
made to the IAEA.150 These declarations included detailed information about equipment, production
practices, and other dimensions of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear activities.151 The IAEA, however, found
the information insufficient and repeatedly negotiated with Iraq regarding more conclusive
documentation about the ultimate capability achievements and foreign assistance involved in the
nuclear weapons program.152 The IAEA gained documentation about Iraq’s research and development
of weaponization capabilities for implosion-type nuclear weapons, but as a result of Iraq’s attempts to
conceal and understate different aspects of the program, as well as interfere with the agreed IAEA
access, it remained unclear on how far the weapons designs proceeded.153 The documentation
collected included highly proliferation-sensitive information about the structure of the weapons, the
high explosives experiments, and many other aspects of the program’s technical aspects.154 The
discovered weapons development and production facilities and equipment were destroyed, removed,
or converted in the mission.155 Ultimately, the IAEA/UNSCOM mission ended with no significant
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discrepancies between the IAEA’s technical assessment and Iraq’s updated declarations, but also with
no certainty about the absence of undeclared activities: “Some uncertainty is inevitable in any countrywide technical verification process which aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or
activities. The extent to which such uncertainty is acceptable is a policy judgment.”156
Both the inspections and declaration analysis allowed access to information that was highly
classified and proliferation-sensitive, which was a significant concern for all sides involved. One critical
question was the specific knowledge and background that inspectors would need to have to
understand weapons production processes, particularly in dual-use facilities.157 In addition, the IAEA
was very concerned about unauthorized access to proliferation-sensitive information, which would be
a violation of Article I under the NTP.158 The details of the inspection procedures are not public, but
it seems that the IAEA only allowed inspectors from nuclear weapons states to be involved in the
most sensitive parts of the verification mission. The nationality of the inspectors, however, became a
barrier for other reasons as well. At the initial stages of the UNSCOM mission in 1992, Iraq maintained
that no British, French, or U.S. weapons inspectors would be permitted to conduct segments of the
verification mission, related to its ballistic missile program. 159 This led to serious confrontations
between Iraq and the different UN Security Council members and concerns about setting a precedent
related to manipulating the composition of international inspection teams.160 Debate about weapons
inspectors and their access continued until the end of the UNSCOM mission. In 1997, Iraq refused
to cooperate with U.S. inspectors and asked them to leave the country, fully blocking inspections that
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involve U.S. inspectors.161 As a response, the IAEA withdrew most of the inspections teams, which
were only allowed to return after UN Security Council action and Russian-facilitated negotiations reestablished inspections.162 Iraq’s dissatisfaction with the presence of U.S. and British inspectors
continued, along with claims that weapons inspectors were collecting intelligence for individual
national objectives, such as airstrike targeting information.163 Overall, both the sensitive information
collected through the mission and the intelligence distributed between the participant states and the
IAEA/UNSCOM mission remained a difficult challenge.164 These questions related to handling
classified and proliferation-sensitive information re-emerged in 2006, when certain conservative
groups in the United States Congress pressured the release of the documents collected by the IAEA
weapons inspectors.165
iv.

The Case of South Africa

South Africa, which maintained an active nuclear program in the 1970s and 80s, is another
important case study in past multilateral verification approaches.166 The program was made public in
March 1993, after South Africa had already dismantled the program, signed on to the NPT, and
concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA in 1991.167 The existence of
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the nuclear weapons program, however, had been known among other states for some time.168 This
case constitutes ex post facto verification, as the international verification mission was established after
the country has already dismantled the facilities and equipment associated with the nuclear weapons
program. In Iraq, the IAEA team was involved in this destruction and dismantlement program as well,
in addition to carrying out similar “after the fact” analysis activities as in South Africa. The Iraq
verification mission influenced the South African case in important ways, as it had revealed significant
insufficiencies in IAEA’s detection capabilities of covert activities.169 Thus, verification in South Africa
was highly intrusive, intended not only to assess the correctness of the state’s declarations, but also
their completeness.170 The verification mission also relied more on member states’ intelligence
capabilities, alongside IAEA’s own verification capabilities.171
Verifying South Africa’s compliance with its new NPT and CSA obligations, including the
completeness of its initial declarations, was requested through resolutions at the IAEA General
Conference and at the United Nations General Assembly.172 A team of senior members at the
Department of Safeguards at the IAEA carried out this request. In consultation with the Atomic
Energy Corporation of South Africa (AEC), they agreed to receive the historical operating and
accounting records of South African nuclear facilities and were allowed to choose a specified number
to be audited through on-site inspections.173 South African officials co-operated with the IAEA
Institute for Science and International Security, “Chapter 10: International Verification,” 4, available at http://isisonline.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Chapter_10_International_Verification_Mechanisms_april_1_2016.pdf.
168

Heinonen, “Verifying the Dismantlement of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 1.
169

Ibid., 3.

170

Ibid.

171

Ibid.

IAEA General Conference, 36th Regular Session, “South Africa’s Nuclear Capabilities,” (GC(XXXV)/RES/567),
https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC36/GC36Documents/English/gc36-1015_en.pdf.
172

United Nations General Assembly, 65th Plenary Meeting, “Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization
of Africa: Nuclear capability of South Africa,” (A/RES/46/34A),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r034.htm.
173

IAEA General Conference, 36th Regular Session, “South Africa’s Nuclear Capabilities.”

64

requirements extensively and allowed a high level of access to nuclear facilities based on IAEA
requests, building confidence in the state’s commitment to abandon its nuclear ambitions.
In the initial declarations and the first IAEA verification reports after the CSA agreements,
the only reference to potential non-peaceful uses were the detection of discrepancies in 235𝑈 isotope
balances in the country’s enrichment plants.174 This conclusion emerged from the calculations that
IAEA officials made on the basis of data provided by the AEC.175 In subsequent reports, these
discrepancies in HEU production were examined through further analyzing operating records and
supporting technical data provided by AEC.176
The IAEA officials were also assigned with assessing the status of South Africa’s former
nuclear weapons program after its existence was declared in 1993.177 The objective was to ensure that
all materials used in weapons were permanently transferred to peaceful uses, non-nuclear weapons
components were destroyed, all facilities had been fully decommissioned or converted to peaceful
uses, and weapons-related equipment had been destroyed or converted.178 Furthermore, the objective
was to understand how the dismantling program had been carried out, how the information relating
to design and manufacturing of nuclear weapons had been destroyed, and how the dismantling process
was carried out.179 Other assignments included obtaining information about the timing and scope of
the nuclear weapons program, decommissioning the Kalahari Desert testing site, visiting the
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decommissioned or abandoned nuclear weapons facilities, and consulting with the South African
government to ensure that the nuclear weapons program could not be regenerated.180
Similar concerns about sensitive information emerged in South Africa as in the Iraq
verification mission. The inspection team involved IAEA Department of Safeguards experts, who
were also accompanied by external nuclear weapons experts.181 This augmentation of the traditional
IAEA team, consisting of safeguards experts, was required because the verification mission would
involve assessing documents regarding the design and manufacturing of the country’s seven gunassembled nuclear devices.182 Similar to the Iraq case, these nuclear weapons experts were mostly only
from nuclear weapons states, ensuring that no sensitive or unauthorized information would be
distributed to non-nuclear weapons states.183 Their status and expertise allowed them to engage with
South African nuclear scientists and officials in a different way that safeguards experts could,
increasing access to information about the nation’s nuclear weapons program.184 They also had the
necessary expertise to be able to recognize activities specific to nuclear arms research and development
efforts during facility inspections.185
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v.

The Case of Libya

A third important case of international verification of nuclear weapons programs took place
in Libya, after the state announced the elimination of its weapons-purpose materials, equipment, and
facilities in 2003 and singed the Additional Protocol to the NPT the following year.186 The international
verification mission, negotiated between Libyan, American, and British officials, intended to establish
the details of the program and its history, as well as understand the origins of the materials and design
information.187 British and American weapons experts continued to play a key role in the verification
mission, assisting Libya in destroying nuclear weapons design documents, materials, and equipment
and interviewing relevant officials and experts in the country.188 Again, as in the case of Iraq and South
Africa, the nationality of the inspectors was important. The Libyans had initially turned to the British,
and the negotiations over dismantling the nuclear weapons program took place between Libya, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.189 At first, in October 2003, trusted access was only provided
to inspectors from these two foreign countries.190 Starting in December 2003, IAEA inspectors were
also invited to participate in the verification mission.191
Management of proliferation-sensitive information was an important aspect of the verification
mission. Libya had reportedly acquired drawings of a weapon design through the A.Q. Khan network,
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and in December 2004, these materials were sealed on-site by the IAEA.192 In the following January,
the documents, ccomponents, and equipment that the inspectors discovered were transported to the
United States under strict rules, including the IAEA seals.193 Other measures, such as the conversion
of Libya’s research reactor, also took place under the multilateral verification mission.
As these experiences in Iraq, South Africa, and Libya demonstrate, the integrity and
confidentiality of information about the nuclear weapons programs was a critical concern in the
international verification missions. These three cases are unique, however, in that the international
verification missions went well beyond the IAEA safeguards principle of collecting the minimum
amount of information needed for the agency to fulfill its mandated verification obligations. 194 The
discovery of covert, highly developed nuclear weapons programs had shocked the IAEA and the
international community, which motivated the extreme intrusiveness that would ensure that all
prohibited activities would be identified and assessed. This was enabled by the fact that the states had
decided, or were pressured, to fully eliminate their nuclear programs, which made the host countries
significantly more open regarding their nuclear weapons programs. Furthermore, none of the cases
involved handling or dismantling fully operational warheads – South Africa had already eliminated the
state’s nuclear weapons stockpile prior to the verification mission, and neither Iraq or Libya had
produced fully operational warheads. These factors made the intrusive access both legitimate for the
IAEA to implement and possible for the host states to accept.
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3. Past Multilateral Verification Systems Protecting Classified
Information
I.

Introduction

In the future, multilateral verification is likely to take place in a context where nuclear-armed
states engage in gradual weapons reductions, which places different pressures to the accompanying
verification mission than verifying the full dismantlement of a nuclear weapons program. The intent
would be to maintain strategic stability throughout the multilateral reduction effort, ensuring that each
state can sustain their deterrent capability while reducing the number of warheads. So long as states
maintain some components of their nuclear weapons programs active, they will need to maintain a
much higher level of confidentiality and secrecy about warhead designs, materials, and facilities. This
would allow much less direct access for inspectors and mandates the use of verification technologies
that do not reveal sensitive information. With multilateral, progressive warhead reductions, states will
be able to insist upon limited intrusiveness, managed access, and the highest standards of information
integrity, which was not the case with Iraq, South Africa, and Libya, which were under intense
international pressure to allow full access to the verification mission.
This chapter explores the efforts that have been made in the past decades to counter the
assumption that high-accuracy verification of warheads would not be possible without compromising
classified information. The focus is on different verification systems that would be able to handle
classified forms of fissile materials, with the intention to develop a system that would allow the
accurate authentication of warheads without revealing sensitive information. It explores the Trilateral
Initiative, which created an attribute verification system (AVNG) in a collaborative effort between the
United States, Russia, and the IAEA; unilateral efforts in the United Kingdom and bilateral efforts
through the U.K.-Norway Initiative to develop an attribute system on very similar principles; and
69

unilateral efforts in national laboratories. The chapter also discusses a more recent multilateral
initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, that also has a technical
working group focused on the technical challenges related to multilateral disarmament. In all of these
efforts, the chapter illustrates how the authentication and certification of the technical equipment
remains as the prevailing issue and how challenges in multilateral verification are concentrated on
information integrity and transparency.

II.

The Trilateral Initiative

One of the pioneering efforts to create mechanisms for this context was the Trilateral
Initiative, a collaboration between the United States, Russia, and the IAEA between 1996 and 2002 to
solve the challenge of sensitive information and conceptualize mechanisms that would allow classified
forms of fissile material contained in their pits and secondaries within a warhead to be handled by the
IAEA.195 The considerations were limited to weapons-usable fissile material, although the parties also
considered addressing warheads their components, or entire weapons systems.196 These levels were
seen too complicated, however, due to security issues. Even addressing weapons-origin materials was
unprecedented, so this was defined as the initiative’s goal.
In essence, the verification of a warhead would only be a more complex case of verifying fissile
material, as it is what makes a weapon nuclear and most approaches of identifying a warhead focus on
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the attributes of the material contained in the warhead.197 This had been explored some years prior to
the establishment of the Trilateral Initiative, through a joint U.S.-Russia study called the Black Sea
Experiments in 1989, which was a one-of-a-kind instance where foreign nuclear scientists have made
radiological measurements of an operational warhead without any attempts to cover the classified
information.198 The experiment was done in the context of the START negotiations and intended to
understand if and how submarine-launched cruise missiles could be verified and what information
would be revealed in the process.199 The study concluded that while the gamma measurement system
used by the U.S. scientists revealed detailed information about the nuclear material contained in the
warhead, it did not allow them to identify sensitive design information or warhead yield.200 Parallel
longer-distance measurements conducted by Russian scientists revealed that their remote detection
methods could identify the warhead as a neutron source, but not provide more detailed information
about its type.201 This highlighted the importance of on-site inspections and close access to warheads
in the verification process to obtain a high level of confidence.
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Figure 3.1. The radiographic signature obtained in the Black Sea experiment. Source: Steve Fetter et
al., “Gamma-Ray Measurements of a Soviet Cruise-Missile Warhead,” Science 248 (1990), 248.
The objective of the Trilateral Initiative was to develop an on-site verification framework that
would protect classified and sensitive information while still providing the highest level of confidence
in the disarmament process for the treaty partner and the inspecting agency.202 These two
considerations are referred as certification, or the process carried out by the host state of ensuring that
no classified information is released, and authentication, where the inspecting agency assures the
validity of the measurements.203 This would ensure political acceptability for all the involved parties,
but also enable the technical intrusiveness required by the treaty verification objectives. 204 The analysis
of potential measurement technologies made it evident that unrestricted measurements would be
unacceptable, as they would reveal highly sensitive information about the items or materials. 205 This
could risk undermining U.S. and Russian obligations under Article I of the NPT, as the IAEA
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inspectors could gain access to sensitive design or production information relating to the states’
nuclear programs.206
Balancing the protection of information and allowing the IAEA access led to the exploration
attribute verification protocols combined with information barriers. Attribute verification refers to the
use of certain characteristics, “attributes,” against which the object or material under consideration is
compared to.207 The measurement system, AVNG, consisted of high-resolution gamma ray
spectroscopy and neutron multiplicity counting, which would establish the presence of plutonium, the
ratio of 239𝑃𝑢 and 240𝑃𝑢, and the mass of 240𝑃𝑢.208 The measurements data to determine these three
attributes, however, would not be accessible to the inspector, as it would be considered classified by
the host state. Instead, the system utilizes information barriers, which are hardware or software
components and methods that divide the measurement information into a classified data layer and an
unclassified display layer.209 The inspector only interacts with the user interface, which only displays
the unclassified result.210 Prior to the system’s implementation, however, it is fully open for inspection
for all the involved parties, enabling them to verify the system’s operability.211 While the data collected
by the system is classified, all the algorithms utilized by the system are fully known by all parties
involved.212
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The challenge with information barriers is that the classified side of the system requires
multiple layers of protection, from tamper indicators to hardware to complex administrative
controls.213 The complexity of this becomes apparent particularly when the system is under
maintenance.214 The system developed in the Trilateral Initiative was irreversible – once some parts of
the system have become classified and measure sensitive information, these segments will remain
classified even if the system is cleared of any sensitive material.215 Later system development led to a
model of the AVNG that could shift between open mode, meant for measurements of unclassified
material, and a secure mode, which would be used for classified materials.216
A proof-of-principle system of the AVNG was demonstrated under the Trilateral Initiative.217
In addition to the system itself, the initiative also created associated systems relating to containment
and surveillance, which would be critical for future warhead verification processes.218 These would
enable the continuity of knowledge of the materials under verification, which were intended to
minimize the complexities involved in reverifying the warhead at a later point of the process. 219 The
AVNG system development continued after the end of the Trilateral Initiative in collaboration with
the United States and Russia, resulting in a fully operational system. 220 In 2009, the system was
demonstrated at Russia’s Institute of Nuclear & Radiation Research, All-Russian Scientific Research
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Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNC-VNIIEF) in the presence of American scientists and
officials.221
The Trilateral Initiative also involved external partners in limited capacities, allowing their
expertise in safeguards and other verification activities to be integrated to the initiative. The United
Kingdom hosted a technical workshop related to the state’s PuO2 verification system and plutonium
storage system under Euratom safeguards.222 Japan held a workshop related to the state’s modern
verification protocols applied to plutonium storage and mixed oxide fuel production.223 Italy also
participated by hosting technical workshop at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission
related to ensuring system certification and authentication.224 This international collaboration indicated
expectations about the shape of things to come – future disarmament would eventually expand to
states outside the U.S.-Russia context.
Ultimately, the greatest challenge encountered under the Trilateral Initiative collaboration was
the authentication of the verification system.225 The critical questions related to the manufacturing of
the system and its components and the subsequent authentication that would be required.226 The first
logical option would be that the IAEA, or other international verification body, would produce the
measurement equipment and allow the host state to authenticate its legitimate operability.227 In the
Trilateral Initiative, it became evident that this would pose challenges. Russian security officials
indicated their requirement to use intrusive and unidentified methods to inspect the equipment for up
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to 18 months, with the authority to deny the equipment without providing their rationale.228 If the
system was accepted, on the other hand, the IAEA would need to repeat this authentication procedure
for ensuring that the system was intact.229 This would lead to a long cycle of authentication and reauthentication, without certainty for either side of system integrity and validity.230
The second option, which the Trilateral Initiative ultimately adopted, would be for the host
state to manufacture the equipment.231 This is referred to as the host-supply principle, according to
which the party whose classified information is at risk has the right to supply the equipment and also
the right to be the last party with access to the equipment in the authentication process. 232 The three
parties would jointly develop the detailed design of the system, the computer processors used, as well
as test it together.233 The actual equipment would be produced within the state where it would be used,
with monitoring from the other two partners.234
While doing critical technical work for multilateral disarmament relating to classified forms of
nuclear material, the Trilateral Initiative left several important issues unaddressed. The AVNG system
focused on verifying plutonium, but developing a parallel system for highly enriched uranium could
pose unique challenges. Furthermore, in future disarmament steps this material could still be contained
within warheads when the IAEA begins the verification mission. The verification mission would
expand the whole dismantlement cycle, from demounting deployed warheads from their delivery
vehicles and uniquely identifying them, to monitoring their transportation and storage and ultimately
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their dismantlement process.235 In addition to IAEA involvement in this process, non-nuclear
weapons states may also become important agents in multilateral verification. The Trilateral Initiative’s
engagement demonstrated that expertise relating to safeguards and other dimensions of the civilian
nuclear sector can also be applied to verification in the military sphere. Furthermore, non-nuclear
weapons states would also want to gain confidence in the irreversibility and validity of the disarmament
process and would likely be interested in gaining understanding of the process. In preparation for
future nuclear disarmament, extensive multilateral engagement especially in the technical research and
development process would be highly beneficial. This would contribute to multilateral disarmament
prospects by pushing the technical solutions forward, but also by creating a common language
between the states involved and building the foundations of trust and confidence in the international
community.

III.

U.K. Efforts and the U.K-Norway Initiative

The Trilateral Initiative was an important stepping stone for multilateral engagement in
verifying classified nuclear materials and items and highlighted the importance of future work in this
field. The idea of involving non-nuclear states in the disarmament process has been explored in
multiple dimensions since the end of the initiative. The legitimacy of the global disarmament effort
requires that all sides are knowledgeable of the process – not only nuclear weapons states engaged in
it. The 2005 NPT Review Conference introduced several working papers from non-nuclear weapons
states related to the disarmament process, including enhancing disarmament and non-proliferation
education and developing multilateral verification mechanisms, independent of national technical
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means.236 Particularly important was the final report on a set of studies undertaken by the United
Kingdom since 1998, focused on the verification of nuclear warheads and their components. 237 This
research was initiated after the 1998 U.K. Strategic Defence Review, which stated that the U.K. is
willing to engage in future multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts, on the condition that the process
is multilaterally verified.238 The goals of the project were to explore multilateral verification
mechanisms of authenticating warheads and their components, dismantling these items securely,
disposing the resulting fissile material irreversibly, and monitoring the overall nuclear weapons
complex.239
The United Kingdom provided the first interim report of the initiative in 2003 to the
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, focused on the first objective of warhead
authentication. The focus on the initiative had been on radiometric non-destructive assay (NDA)
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measurement technologies, including passive gamma ray spectrometry, passive and active neutron
coincidence counting, and neutron multiplicity, as well as demonstrated their implementation on real
warheads and their nuclear components.240 This work on passive radiation signatures was based on
identifying the spontaneous neutron or gamma radiation emitted by the warhead’s plutonium and
uranium content, which would reveal the presence, distribution, quantity, and isotopic type and
composition of the fissile material.241 The active radiation signatures, on the other hand, relied on
active gamma or X-ray irradiation of the low atomic number elements contained in the warheads, such
as deuterium, tritium and beryllium.242 In addition, the technical work also involved computer
modelling.243 These active and passive measurement systems and models were tested on
decommissioned warheads (WE177 and Chevaline) and still deployed warheads (Trident), including
their primary and secondary sub-assemblies and re-entry bodies, inside and outside different
containers.244
The first interim report concluded that extensive knowledge about a warhead held in a
container can be assessed through these radiation measurements, including type, components,
geometrical shape, and internal characteristics.245 Access to the raw measurement data would make it
possible to reverse engineer the design and configuration of the warhead.246 Thus, one of the key
conclusions is that this proliferation-sensitive and classified information ought to be fully protected in
Second Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, “Verification of nuclear disarmament: First
interim report on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their components: Working paper submitted by
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” (NPT/CONF.2005/PC II/WP.1).
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any verification scenario.247 In addition, the interim report highlighted the importance of developing
chain of custody, provenance, and managed access mechanisms in support of the authentication.248
The second interim report focused on the dismantlement of warheads, emphasizing that
protecting design and security information is one of the most critical aspects of the process. 249
Furthermore, it will be important to develop continuity of knowledge mechanisms to prove that the
end products of the dismantlement process came from the intended authenticated warhead.250 To this
end, a template verification system could be implemented with non-destructive analysis images of
warheads, enabling the identification of the warhead and its type through time-correlated template
comparison.251 These radiation signature comparisons have been researched in the past, for example
in the context of a technical study by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1996. 252 The second U.K.
interim report also discussed a mock inspection that the project implemented, including the future
importance of these activities and the challenges that remain unresolved.253
The final report focused on the management of the nuclear weapons complex, but also
brought together the other dimensions of the project.254 One key conclusion is that advancements in
technical fields, such as neutron detection accuracy, can increase the information that is possible to
collect in the verification process, but also that this must be balanced with proliferation and national
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security concerns.255 The combination of different non-destructive assay methods, such as passive
auto radiography, gold foil activation, and photo-neutron interrogation, was discussed as a potential
mechanism to detect spoofing, but more work needs to be done on identifying the benefits and risks
of the different measurement techniques.256 In addition, information barriers were also researched as
a way to protect classified and sensitive information.257 Overall, the final report concluded
authentication to be the most difficult task in disarmament verification, as the techniques would need
to simultaneously protect sensitive and classified information, have a high confidence of detecting
spoofing, and be otherwise fully secure.258
This work contributed to the United Kingdom’s continued engagement in developing
verification mechanisms for the future. The state began a joint effort with Norway in 2007, which was
a first case of close collaboration between a nuclear and non-nuclear weapons state on warhead
dismantlement.259 The initiative also involved VERTIC, a UK-based non-governmental organization
focused on verification, monitoring and confidence-building in international agreements.260 The
overarching theme of the U.K.-Norway Initiative was on understanding how non-nuclear weapons
states could facilitate trust and confidence in multilateral nuclear disarmament and become involved
in the process while not gaining access to proliferation-sensitive information.261 In practice, it focused
on continuing the efforts of the Trilateral Initiative on information barrier technology, as well as
conceptualizing managed access methodologies through simulated exercises.262 First, the initiative
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established that the limited information available about past experiments on information barriers
could undermine the trust that non-nuclear weapons states could have on verification systems.263 In
order to facilitate the legitimacy of these instruments, non-nuclear weapons states should be involved
in their development and demonstration efforts.264 The Trilateral Initiative had concluded that the
host country should be allowed to manufacture the verification equipment, such as the AVNG system,
but the U.K.-Norway Initiative explored how non-nuclear weapons states could be involved, as a
means of increasing transparency and trust in the process.265At the beginning, the initiative also
surveyed the lessons learned from the previous studies carried out by the United Kingdom. One key
insight was that the human side of verification has been largely neglected, both from the perspective
of undermining the successful use of a verification technologies, but also from the viewpoint of
promoting trust through non-technological means.266 In addition, it was also concluded that a
particular technical solution to verification increases in legitimacy based on several characteristics,
including the ability to protect sensitive information, its simplicity, familiarity, and lower level of
intrusiveness.267
The two technical aspects that the initiative focused on, information barriers and managed
access, were considered complimentary and interconnected.268 Managed access would allow inspectors
to access sensitive warhead environments and conduct their verification measurements behind an
information barrier, allowing proliferation-sensitive information to remain intact.269
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The initiative addressed the initialization problem, which refers to the challenge of
authenticating a warhead to be real at the beginning of its dismantlement process.270 Particularly, the
focus was on the involvement of inspectors from non-nuclear weapons states in the process, which
would make information integrity even more important, as any breach would violate Article I of the
NPT.271 Two proof-of-concept information barriers were built, one in the United Kingdom and one
in Norway, such that strict non-proliferation concerns were addressed and that the involved nonnuclear weapon state would gain confidence through its direct involvement in the design and
manufacturing process of the system.272 As the focus was on illuminating this interactive process,
rather than developing a fully demonstrable system, the system detected cobalt-60 inside a mock
warhead, instead of weapons-grade fissile material contained in a real warhead.273 The system was
similar to that developed under the Trilateral Initiative, but instead of having three attributes measured,
it only determined the presence or absence on cobalt-60.274 Overall, the system design emphasized
simplicity, affordability, and easy maintenance, which are considerations that will be important in the
future but have received less attention in past research and development efforts.275
On the managed access side, the research started from the assumption that foreign inspectors
would need to access highly sensitive facilities and environments, which could risk proliferationsensitive and security information at risk.276 Thus, traditional on-site inspection practices must be
modified such that the specific conditions are considered.277
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The disarmament research in the United Kingdom also led to ongoing bilateral collaboration
with the United States since 2000, focused on monitoring and verifying future nuclear disarmament. 278
The collaboration is facilitated by the fact that the states are able to exchange classified nuclear
weapons information between each other, based on the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA),
which diminishes concerns about breakdowns in information integrity in the testing phases of new
measurement technologies or other cases.279 Thus, the collaboration has tested measurement
technologies and methods with actual warheads and components and has been able to discuss and
compare differences between the states at a highly detailed level.280 The focus in the initiative is also
on authentication and certification of the measurement technologies, parallel with protecting sensitive
information related to warheads and their environments.281
Activities under the collaboration have focused on warhead measurement and data analysis,
managed access, and other technical fields.282 In 2011, the states engaged in the Warhead Monitored
Dismantlement (WMD) Exercise, which was a fictious scenario of two states negotiating an arms
reduction treaty and the affiliated verification provisions, which involved monitored dismantlement.283
Through joint planning at a Joint Chain of Custody Working Group and Joint Nondestructive Assay
Methods Working Group, the states agreed on a monitoring protocol that was tested in an exercise at
an operational British nuclear facility that utilized a mock warhead with actual fissile material and
simulated explosives.284 Similar to the findings ender the Trilateral Initiative, one of the important
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conclusions was that the simultaneous and mutually agreed equipment certification by the host and
authentication by the inspector is difficult to achieve.285
Another important example of the collaboration’s work was the Active Measurement
Campaign, which explored the use of active interrogation technologies in verification.286 The
experiment focused on assessing the value of active interrogation systems in warhead verification, as
well as solving the concerns relating to shielding and radiation environment dangers for personnel. 287
The researchers concluded that these systems can be highly valuable for verification purposes,
especially when the specific technique is chosen based on the target radiation source.288 The
collaboration has also involved two Authentication Workshops, in 2009 and 2014, with one of the key
conclusions being that states have differing priorities and concerns in the authentication and
certification of measurement equipment in warhead verification.289 These past joint exercises have
contributed to the collaboration’s current work on the development of a radiation portal monitoring
system under the U.S.-U.K. Portal Monitor for Arms Control (PMAC) project that aims to develop a
system enabling simultaneous host certification and inspector authentication.290 Since 2012, the
collaboration has also engaged in collecting a radiation signature data set of nuclear warheads and
components, which could significantly contribute to future research on warhead verification.291
The U.K.-Norway and U.S.-U.K. collaboration are important examples of engagement in joint
development of future verification systems, each initiative contributing unique insights into this field.
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Going forward, collaboration must become increasingly inclusive and engage states that have not been
involved in these efforts, whether nuclear or non-nuclear weapons states. In 2009, the U.S.-U.K.
collaboration took an important step towards this direction, expanding the collaboration to the other
five nuclear weapons states recognized under the NTP through briefing the states of the findings of
the U.S.-U.K. collaboration.292 This was taken further in the form of a joint presentation in 2014 at
the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.293
The Trilateral Initiative and the U.K.-Norway Initiative are only two examples of research
efforts to develop systems that can handle classified forms of fissile materials, and thus could be used
for warhead verification. Several systems have been developed in U.S. national laboratories that have
also been demonstrated to Russian officials. Similar to the systems developed in the Trilateral Initiative
and the U.K.-Norway Initiative, these systems include TRADS (Trusted Radiation Attribute
Demonstration System), AMS/IB (Attribute Measurement System using Information Barriers), NGAMS (Next Generation Attribute Measurement System), and 3GAMS (Third Generation Attribute
Measurement System), which have been created in collaborative efforts between different U.S.
national laboratories.294 Independent efforts have also been done in other countries, including China,
where the Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry (INPC) in China Academy of Engineering
Physics (CAEP) has developed an attribute verification system for plutonium subassemblies using an
information barrier.295
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IV.

Future Dimensions

The development of verification systems in a multilateral context is critical, as in a potential
future disarmament scenario these systems would be used to verify nuclear weapons under
international agreements. Pursuing multilateral development efforts, however, also requires a
diplomatic framework for facilitating communications between states. An example of a group that has
formed in recent years is the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which
is a joint initiative led by the U.S. State Department and the Nuclear Threat Initiative involving 28
nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states focused on nuclear disarmament verification.296 The
fundamental objective of the partnership is to foster common understanding and trust among all
involved parties, as well as explore the technical challenges related to multilateral verification.297 The
partnership engages in practical collaboration on new technologies in different phases of disarmament
through its three working groups, but the underlying understanding is that a collective sense of
confidence is required to establish legitimacy in the all novel verification technologies.298
The focus of IPNDV on engaging states with little to no experience in verification outside the
civilian IAEA safeguards, which includes most states apart from the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and Norway. The partnership enables these states to think about challenging verification
issues for the first time, enabling them to understand the professional skills needed in the process and
the complexity of the issues involved. One of the key outcomes of the partnership so far is that nonnuclear weapons states could be involved in most activities in disarmament verification without
compromising proliferation-sensitive information. This goes against the prevailing assumption among
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certain actors in the non-proliferation and disarmament communities, according to which the
involvement of non-nuclear weapons states could be highly risky. In addition to this key insight, the
partnership has also engaged in dialogue on the relationship between political and technical needs and
capabilities in verification.
These past multilateral efforts to develop technical verification capabilities demonstrate that
states are aware of the criticality of having new verification options available for future stages of arms
control. As the previous discussion has shown, the critical challenge will be maintaining the
confidentiality of classified and sensitive information related to the inspected warheads, while
providing transparency and a high level of confidence in the verification process. Both for nuclear
weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states alike, these values would be critical in a future
multilateral disarmament agreement. As has been discussed here, past technical solutions have
employed information barriers to allow these two objectives to be reached simultaneously. With
information barriers, the prevailing challenge continues to be the authentication and certification of
the technical equipment, and developing trusted processors that can be used in these processes.299
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4. Physics of Nuclear Weapons
I.

Introduction

The political and historical perspectives provided in previous chapters pave the way for a
discussion on a set of emerging warhead authentication methods, which rely on zero-knowledge
proofs to solve the challenge between maintaining the confidentiality of design information and
providing transparency in the verification process. Before explaining these emerging approaches in
the following chapter, however, it is necessary to explore more in depth the physics and design of
nuclear warheads, as well as the methods that can be used to detect them. This will allow for a more
detailed discussion of the techniques under consideration in the following chapter.
This chapter explains the fundamental physics of how nuclear weapons operate and illustrates
what the key drivers of behind nuclear weapons design are. These general details about the physics of
nuclear weapons are available to the public, but as will be discussed later in this chapter, the specifics
of modern design features are highly guarded by nuclear weapons states.300 The discussion in this
chapter is limited to the principles that are important to understand from a policymaker’s perspective,
particularly for the purposes of the following chapter, which leaves out considerations about the
quantum mechanical and many other effects associated with the physics. The motivation is to
illuminate what the realities of detecting nuclear warheads are, as well as discuss why such a high level
of secrecy is associated with specific design features of nuclear warheads. This leads to the discussion
in the next chapter, which focuses on verification mechanisms that allow the design details to be kept
concealed, while also providing a high-accuracy mechanism for authenticating the warheads. The
300 Even if states knew the details of each other’s warheads, political barriers also come into play: “Aside from
commonality in application of basic physical principles and practices, neither side in a treaty is likely to have much
detailed knowledge of each other’s nuclear warhead design, and if they did they're not likely to admit it.” (Alexander
DeVolpi, “Tagging and Fissile Material Verification Concepts for Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement,” INMM 31st Annual
Meeting (1990), 1.)
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discussion in the chapter shows that the concerns about revealing classified design information can
be genuine, although these concerns are also inherently political, which illuminates why these highsecurity verification mechanisms will remain relevant in the future.

II.

Fissile Material

Nuclear weapons can be based on two different physical mechanisms – fission and fusion.
The discussion here will be limited to fission weapons, which were the first type of nuclear weapons
that was developed, with the Little Boy and Fat Man used during the Second World War representing
this category of weapons. In modern nuclear weapons, fission and fusion are used jointly in the same
warhead, which explains why they are significantly more powerful than weapons using either
mechanism alone. In these weapons, the fission mechanism is first initiated by explosives, which
compress the nuclear material to a critical state. This fission reaction results in the release of highenergy, short-wavelength radiation (X-rays) that increases the temperature and pressure in the material,
which then facilitates the fusion mechanism.301 In this description, the focus is on the first stage – the
fission reaction.
Fission reactions, which were discovered in the late 1930s, occur when a heavy nucleus splits
into two lighter nuclei, which are called fission fragments.302 This process releases a large amount of
energy – although comparatively much less than fusion reactions do – which can be inferred from the
difference in nuclear binding energy between the original and the new nuclei. Binding energy is defined
as the energy gain of forming the nucleus, compared to the condition where the constituent protons

301 Union of Concerned Scientists, “How Do Nuclear Weapons Work?” last modified September 30, 2016, accessed
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and neutrons are separated, and is the result of the residual strong interaction between protons and
neutrons.303 For a mass M(A,Z) the binding energy B(A,Z) is formally defined as:
𝐵(𝐴, 𝑍) = 𝑍 𝑀𝑝 𝑐 2 + (𝐴 − 𝑍)𝑀𝑛 𝑐 2 − 𝑀(𝐴, 𝑍)𝑐 2
The two relevant isotopes for fission reactions utilized in nuclear weapons are
239

235

𝑈 and

𝑃𝑢. The first one can be accumulated through enriching natural uranium, which is mostly

The plutonium isotope can be produced by irradiating

238

𝑈.

238

𝑈 with neutrons in a reprocessing facility.

These isotopes are important because they are fissile, meaning that their fission can be initiated when
they interact with thermal neutrons.304 These fissile isotopes are distinct from isotopes that are merely
fissionable, where the fission reaction can be induced with high-energy neutrons.305 This difference
stems from the composition of the nuclei, where the odd-even (odd number of neutrons, even number
of protons) nucleus of
nucleus of

235

𝑈 has a higher ground state, or lower binding energy, than the even-even

238

𝑈 (even number of both protons and neutrons).306 This is because the even-even type

of nucleus are generally more stable than even-odd or odd-even one, due to the Pauli exclusion
principle.307 The principle states that no two particles with a half-integer spin (fermions) can be in the
same quantum state within the same quantum system. In this context, the principle precludes protons
and neutrons (which have half-integer spins as baryons, so they are also fermions) from occupying the
same quantum state and they thus would be expected to have opposite spins. Thus, nucleus
configurations where there are equal numbers of protons and neutrons are favored, and when this is
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not true, there is a correction term that increases in significance as the atomic number increases. 308
This asymmetry term thus contributes to the binding energy:

Figure 4.1. Binding energy per nucleon as a function of the atomic mass number, divided between
its different components. Source: Sylvie Braibant, Giorgio Giacomelli, and Maurizio Spurio, Particles
and Fundamental Interactions: An Introduction to Particle Physics (Verlag: Springer, 2009), 428.
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The binding energy associated with each isotope can be inferred from the graph representing
nuclear binding energy:

Figure 4.2. Average binding energy per nucleon as a function of mass number. Note 235𝑈 and
238
𝑈 on the right. Source: Sylvie Braibant, Giorgio Giacomelli, and Maurizio Spurio, Particles and
Fundamental Interactions: An Introduction to Particle Physics (Verlag: Springer, 2009), 421.
Importantly, both uranium and plutonium are on the right, where the binding energy per
nucleon is decreasing as the atomic mass number is increasing. This means that the protons and
neutrons in the nucleus are relatively lightly bound together, and the relative contribution of
electromagnetic force increases.309 The resulting fission fragments are medium-sized nuclei that have
a higher binding energy per nucleon.
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For

235

𝑈, there are almost 400 potential fission pathways, with some being more probable

than others and involve the transition isotope 236𝑈 due to the neutron absorption.310 One example of
a fission reaction is the nuclei’s breakdown into 148𝐿𝑎 and 87𝐵𝑟:
235
92 𝑈

+𝑛 →

148
57𝐿𝑎

+

87
35𝐵𝑟

+ 𝑛

The distribution of these fission fragments of 235𝑈 are concentrated such that one of them is
highly likely to have a mass number of approximately 90, and the other of 140.311

Figure 4.3. The probabilistic distribution of fission fragments that result from the fission of 235𝑈
induced by thermal neutrons. Source: Noboru Takigava and Kouhei Washiyama, Fundamentals of
Nuclear Physics (Tokyo: Springer, 2017), 46.

310 Mark Tuckerman, “CHEM-UA 127: Advanced General Chemistry I,” New York University,
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Figure 4.4. The distribution of the neutrons, with varying energy levels, that are released in the
fission of 236𝑈. Source: Bruce Cameron Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan Project (New York:
Springer, 2015), 27.
Energy equivalent to the difference in binding energy between the original and the resulting
nuclei is released in nuclear fission, in the form of the kinetic energy of the fission fragments, kinetic
energy associated with the released neutrons, and photons.312 For

235

𝑈, the binding energy per

nucleon is -7.5 MeV, and for the lanthanum and barium isotopes together it is -8.4 MeV.313 Thus, the
energy release is 0.9 MeV per nucleon in a fission reaction, so in total for the 235 nucleons
approximately:
235 ∗ 0.9 𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 210 𝑀𝑒𝑉
The average number of immediate neutrons released in the reaction is 2.5, each of which can
initiate a new fission reaction.314 For 239𝑃𝑢, the average number of neutrons is 2.9. Since the number
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of neutrons produced in the reactions is greater than the number consumed by it, the fission of one
nucleus can create more than just one new fission reaction. This feature makes it possible for the
fission reaction to proceed as a chain reaction, which is self-sustaining. This process is defined to be
critical when self-sustainability is achieved, which can be calculated based on the effective neutron
multiplication factor k:

𝑘=

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 (𝑛 + 1) 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

The factor k describes the number of fission reactions that are initiated, on average, by
neutrons that leave the reaction. When k reaches the value of 1, the mass is said to be critical and thus
self-sustaining.315 Below this value, the process is sub-critical. When k is above one, the mass reaches
a supercritical stage, where the rate of neutrons produced and thus energy-releasing fission reactions
increases exponentially. Reaching this stage is the core idea in nuclear weapons, where the energy
release increases exponentially due to the supercritical conditions.
An important concept to understand in this context is critical mass, which determines how
much fissile material is required to start the self-sustaining chain reaction. The challenge in sustaining
the chain reaction relates to the spatial scale of the events associated with fission reactions, where the
nuclei fills only one-thousandth of the space contained in an atom.316 In order for the fission chain to
continue, a released neutron must encounter the nucleus of another atom.317 The likelihood of this
encounter, however, is exceedingly small due to the tiny size of the nucleus as well as the neutron, and
the neutron can reach the material’s surface before encountering a nucleus.318 This is the case even in
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extremely dense materials, such as solid uranium or plutonium. Quantitatively, the neutron’s behavior
is described by the variable mean free path, which is the average distance between the collisions.319 As
the size of this mass increases, so does the likelihood that neutrons encounter nuclei on their path and
thus spark new fission reactions. Critical mass is the threshold at which the continuation of the fissile
chain reactions is ensured and the density of neutrons within the mass is increasing as a function of
time.320
Critical mass does not only depend on the neutrons’ behavior, but also varies as a function of
the density of the fissile material, the cross-section of the material, the number of neutrons released,
and the kinetic energy of these neutrons.321 Making calculations about critical mass requires the use of
time-dependent diffusion theory, which allows the calculation of a critical radius at which the chain
reaction becomes self-sustaining. This radius can then be converted to a critical mass based on which
fissile material is used and what its attributes are.322

III.

Warhead Design

This fission chain-reaction takes place inside nuclear warheads, which can be either implosionor gun-type. Little Boy, the nuclear weapon used in Hiroshima, was a gun-assembly warhead, whereas
Fat Man, the weapon used in Nagasaki, was implosion-type. The benefit of a gun-assembly weapon is
its simple design, but it is less efficient (only 1.38% of the uranium in Little Boy was fissioned), only
compatible with using

235

𝑈, and heavier and larger than implosion-type warheads.323 Thus, modern

nuclear arsenals contain warheads that employ the implosion design, which have the advantage of
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compatibility with plutonium, which has a higher fission rate than uranium; better efficiency while
using lower amounts of fissile material; and thus overall lower-weigh weapons.324 The following
section briefly describes the mechanisms used in these two warhead types, based on the Little Boy and
Fat Man designs.
In a gun-assembly nuclear weapon, “a conventional explosion forces together two subcritical
masses of uranium creating critical mass and starting a nuclear chain reaction.”325 The first subcritical
mass is a hollow spherical pit, and the second one is a cylindrical core.326 Bringing together these two
subcritical masses at high speed produces the a supercritical mass, in an assembly where the core is
fired through a gun barrel, similar to a bullet, into the pit.327 This is due to the fact that the density of
the system is defined as mass divided by volume, where volume varies as a cube of radius (for a
spherical mass). When the original spherical pit (containing one or more critical masses) is made
hollow, and a certain amount of fissile material is removed from the core, two subcritical masses are
formed.328 This is because the critical mass has an inverse-square relationship with the density of the
fissile material.329 The core idea is to reunite these two subcritical masses at a later point, under high
pressure conditions, to create a mass that is supercritical.

324 Carey Sublette, “Implosion Assembly,” Nuclear Weapons Archive, accessed March 25, 2017,
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Figure 4.5. Little Boy. Source: Bruce Cameron Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan Project (New York:
Springer, 2015), 71, originally Alan Carr, Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Figure 4.6. Mechanism of an implosion assembly. Source: Bruce Cameron Reed, The Physics of the
Manhattan Project (New York: Springer, 2015), 70.
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Figure 4.7. The structure of Little Boy. Bruce Cameron Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan Project
(New York: Springer, 2015), 71. Original source: John Coster-Mullen, Atom Bombs: The Top Secret
Story of Little Boy and Fat Man.
The fissile material is at the core of the weapon, with the gun design forming its spine. 330 In
Little Boy, the core was in the shape of a projectile, which was fired into uranium target discs to form
the supercritical mass. This fissile material is surrounded by tamper or reflector material.331 The
purpose of the tamper material, made out of tungsten carbide mixed with cobalt, is to contain the

330

Coster-Mullen, Atom Bombs, 24.

331

Ibid., 17.

100

fissile material in its shape as the chain reaction starts to exert pressure on it and reflect neutrons back
into the material.332 Depleted uranium is another option for the tamper material. Outside this reflector,
a heavy steel case supports the material and holds the weapon together.
The mechanism that activates the chain reaction is formed out of four polonium-beryllium
initiators, which serves as a neutron generator.333 Alpha decay takes place in polonium, and the
resulting alpha particles ( 42𝐻𝑒) are captured by the beryllium, which then releases neutrons in the
reaction. The two materials are initially separated by a thin gold foil, but when the uranium projectile
hits its uranium target discs, this foil is also torn in the process and the two materials mix.334 This
results in the immediate release of a large number of neutrons, feeding the chain reaction. The bomb
also contains an arming and fusing system that consist of “clock switches, safing and arming plugs,
six barometric (baro) switches, and the Radar Network” that together made it possible to send the
firing signal when the bomb reached the desired burst height.335
An implosion assembly weapon brings its enclosed fissile material to subcriticality through
compression.336 It contains a spherical or cylindrical fissile material mass, originally in a subcritical
state, and uses high explosives at the outer surface of the mass to create an implosion shock wave that
compresses the mass, increasing its density, and thus allowing it to become supercritical.337 The mass
can also be hollow, with the shock wave collapsing it in the process.338 The density of the material can
become two-fold or more, as the pressure brings the atoms closer together.339 As was discussed earlier,
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the critical mass varies inversely as a square of density, so by increasing the density by a factor of two,
the critical mass becomes four times as large.340 This means that a mass that starts subcritical becomes
supercritical in the compression process. Another effect of the compression is a reduction in the mean
free path, or the average distance that a neutron travels between collisions. Mean free path is inversely
proportional to density, so an increase in density shortens the mean free path and thus increases the
number of neutron collisions in the matter, leading to more rapid and efficient chain reactions. 341
Similar to the gun-type assembly, implosion devices have initiators in the design, but they are located
at the center of the core and are mixed when the shock wave from the explosion hits the initiator.342
In the case of Fat Man, the fissile material contained was plutonium, but implosion weapons can use
either highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

Figure 4.8. Fat Man. Source: James Corson, “Overview of Nuclear Weaponry,” University of Virginia,
Metals in Medicine and the Environment, accessed March 26, 2017,
http://faculty.virginia.edu/metals/cases/corson3.html.
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Figure 4.9. The structure of Fat Man. Source: Bruce Cameron Reed, The Physics of the Manhattan
Project (New York: Springer, 2015), 133. Original Source: John Coster-Mullen, Atom Bombs: The Top
Secret Story of Little Boy and Fat Man.

IV.

Modern Nuclear Weapons

These two simplified descriptions of the dynamics of the two initial designs of nuclear
weapons only provide a hint of the complexity associated with the design of modern nuclear weapons.
Little Boy and Fat Man were developed under intense pressure during the Second World War and the
design decisions “were products of the circumstances in which they were created, and those
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circumstances would not apply to any nation building a bomb since then.”343 The sophistication of
modern nuclear weapons designs is exponentially greater and include several important design
breakthroughs that have made the weapons significantly more powerful. With respect to implosiontype fission weapons, these advancements include levitated pits, more efficient high explosives,
multipoint detonation, and solid state neutron generators as higher-efficiency initiators.344 In addition,
the delivery systems and mechanisms for nuclear warheads have been transformed since the Second
World War, which has directed the design of weapons in important ways.345 The greatest
transformation came about with the development of thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen weapons),
which employ nuclear fusion. As was discussed earlier, most modern weapons utilize both fission and
fusion in their design, for example as fusion-boosted fission weapons, fission-fusion weapons, or
fission-fusion-fission weapons.346 Another modern design feature is variable yield, or ‘dial-a-yield’
weapons, where the yield of the weapon can be adapted.347
The advancements made in weapon miniaturization and other technical features can be
tracked through the yield-to-weight ratio, as shown in Figure 4.10, which is one measure of bomb
efficiency. It also provides a way to compare Little Boy (Mk-1) and Fat Man (Mk-3) to modern U.S.
nuclear weapons.348 Thermonuclear weapons, which are much higher yield, but also significantly
heavier – note that both the x and y axis are logarithmic – are towards the upper-right hand corner.
Tactical nuclear weapons are on the lower left, showing that the demands of lighter weight and smaller

343

Ibid.

344

Ibid.

345

Ibid.

Carey Sublette, “Thermonuclear Weapons Design,” Nuclear Weapons Archive, accessed March 26, 2017,
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-5.html.
346

347 United States Department of Energy, “Restricted Data Declassification Decisions: 1946 to the Present (RDD-8),”
Office of Health, Safety and Security, Office of Classification, January 1, 2002, https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/rdd-8.pdf, 68.

Alex Wellerstein, “Kilotons per Kilogram,” Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, December 23, 2013,
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/12/23/kilotons-per-kilogram/
348

104

yield also result in a worse yield-to-weight ratio.349 Most currently deployed U.S. nuclear weapons are
in the middle, as indicated by the redder shade, that are high-accuracy, moderate-yield, and relatively
lighter, and have a comparatively good yield-to-weight ratio. One example is the W-88, whose design
is shown in Figure 4.11, which is a two-stage implosion weapon with a yield of 475 Kt and weight of
approximately 360 kg.350 The ratio of these modern weapons is still less than half of the optimum that
has been possible to reach.351 The yield-to-weight ratio is also useful for comparing the nuclear
capabilities across nations. For example, with respect to the increasing yields of weapons during the
peak of the U.S.-Soviet arms race, it was evident that the higher-yield Soviet weapons relied more on
direct scaling up rather than technical developments, as the yield-to-weight ratios of the weapons
remained stable.352
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Figure 4.10. The weight of warheads in the U.S. nuclear arsenal as a function of their yield. Source:
Alex Wellerstein, “Kilotons per Kilogram,” Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, December 23,
2013, http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/12/23/kilotons-per-kilogram/
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Figure 4.11. The design of W88, one of the modern U.S. warheads. Source: Carey Sublette, “The
W88 Warhead,” Nuclear Weapons Archive, accessed March 25, 2017,
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/W88.html

V.

Physics of Radiation Signatures and Warhead Detection

The previous sections discuss the general physics and design of warheads, which can be
employed in different ways to create mechanisms to detect these objects. These techniques mainly rely
on identifying the radiation outputs from the warheads. As has been explicated, the most important
fissile materials used in warheads are

235
92 𝑈

and

239
94 𝑃𝑢 .

These two isotopes are radioactive, meaning

that they are unstable and spontaneously undergo fission reactions that emit particles and radiation.
This process can also be induced externally by using a radiation source. In general, radioisotopes can
produce neutrons, alpha particles (emission of 24𝐻𝑒), or beta particles (emission of an electron) in the
239
reactions.353 In the case of 235
92 𝑈 and 94 𝑃𝑢 , the emitted particles are neutrons, but other isotopes also
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undergo alpha decay, which results in more complex reactions in the materials contained in
warheads.354 The reactions also release electromagnetic radiation of various wavelengths, most
importantly gamma radiation.355 The spectrum of gamma rays emitted by a specific isotope is unique
to that isotope, which can be used as a mechanism to identify it.
As has been discussed, the design of nuclear weapons includes different conformations of the
fissile material, as well as other features such as tamper materials, a casing, and non-nuclear
components. All of these characteristics affect the way that particles and electromagnetic radiation
travel through the materials, including being scattered and absorbed in the process, and thus also affect
the radiation signature that is obtained.356 The interactions can also result in new releases of radiation,
such as when the neutrons escape from the fissile material and interact with other materials in the
warheads.357 The geometry of the design and the composition of the materials in the warhead thus
result in a distinguishable radiation signature that is unique to each type of warhead. Figure 4.11 shows
an example of the radiographic profile of a Soviet warhead, measured in the Black Sea experiment in
July 1989, using gamma rays.358 The warhead design and the radioactive materials determine the
techniques that can be used for detection, as they define the range of radiation outputs that reach the
warhead environment without being tampered.359
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Figure 4.11. The radiographic signature obtained in the Black Sea experiment. Source: Steve Fetter
et al., “Gamma-Ray Measurements of a Soviet Cruise-Missile Warhead,” Science 248 (1990), 248.
Spectroscopy refers to passive techniques that detect the electromagnetic radiation absorbed,
emitted, or scattered from materials.360 When spectroscopy is used in the context of warhead detection,
the systems mostly focus on detecting neutrons or gamma rays (energy above the 0.1 MeV range), as
they are detectable at least at two meters’ distance from the warhead.361 This is because the radiation
flux (of either particles or electromagnetic radiation) decreases inversely as a function of the square of
the distance from the warhead.362 Detecting the gamma-ray spectra of a warhead can be done with a
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high level of accuracy, and the measurement data also conveys the specific material composition of
the fissile and other materials in the warhead.363 Neutron detectors, on the other hand, are less accurate
with respect to the energy of the emitted neutrons, and cannot identify the origin. These passive
methods, overall, have some disadvantages with respect to specific weapons designs, such as those
that use neither plutonium as the fissile material nor depleted uranium as the tamper material.364
Warheads without these design features, combined with heavy casings, might be very difficult to detect
using passive methods.365
Active methods can also be used in detecting warheads. Radiography refers to an imaging
method that uses of electromagnetic radiation, below the wavelength of visible light, to determine the
composition and structure of objects. Radiography can also be used with particles; neutron
radiography, for example, is the process of using thermal neutrons to construct high-definition images.
The idea is that the transmission of actively produced electromagnetic radiation or particles is
measured, with the detection apparatus being on the other side of the object. In the context of
warheads, this allows for the identification of the fissile material inside the warhead, because the 235
92 𝑈
366
and 239
94 𝑃𝑢 isotopes react differently to the radiation than other materials.

The benefit of neutron radiography, compared to electromagnetic radiation, is that the
attenuation patterns are more dissimilar between different elements and materials. The X-ray
radiographs of the objects, for example, can be too similar to differentiate.367 This is shown in Figure
4.12, which compares the attenuation patterns of materials for 120 keV X-ray radiography and neutron
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radiography. The greater variation in neutron attenuation patterns, which are distinct even between
isotopes, indicates the greater distinguishing ability of this method, compared to X-ray radiography.
When comparing the use of neutron and gamma rays for radiography, the latter is not as effective for
distinguishing heavy elements from fissile materials. On the other hand, gamma rays produce a higherresolution radiographs, because developing a well-collimated and monoenergetic neutron source and
measuring the energy of transmitted neutrons is more difficult than that of gamma rays.368 Overall,
the choice of radiography method is dependent on what the other potential materials in the warheads
are. Thermal neutrons, for example, may not be sufficient to distinguish between the weapons-grade
plutonium and uranium from materials that absorb thermal neutrons as efficiently, such as lithium
and boron.369

Figure 4.12. The mass attenuation coefficient as a function of the mass number, both for X-rays
and thermal neutrons. Source: Harold Berger, Neutron Radiography (Amsterdam: Elsevier Pub. Co.,
1965), 335.
368 Collimation refers to the alignment of the transmitted neutrons from the source. (Source: Steve Fetter et al.,
“Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” 280.)
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The methods discussed in this section are used in the verification approaches described in the
next chapter. As has been shown here, both radiography and spectroscopy are useful in different ways
for verification purposes, and the choice of the measurement system depends on the specific
conditions in question. Radiography would describe more precisely the shape of the object, whereas
spectroscopy would determine what materials were used in it. These could also be combined with
other techniques, such as neutron multiplicity counting and other assay methods.370 As will be
discussed next, the central issue in these measurements is that the raw data of the spectra could be
used to understand the design details of the warheads, which would be hard for states to accept for
both technical and political reasons.371 This is the core challenge that the next chapter will discuss.

VI.

Significance of Weapon Design for Verification

The previous analysis of the physics and design of nuclear weapons illustrates how the details
of the warheads matter to the efficiency and yield of the weapons. From a state perspective, the value
and utility of nuclear weapons is highly dependent on these two parameters, which is one dimension
of why they prioritize secrecy with respect to the design of their nuclear weapons. A range of political
and psychological variables are also at play, of course, but the following discussion focuses on the
technical rationale for maintaining secrecy about weapons design. This is the fundamental reason why
it will be important to develop verification mechanisms for warheads that maintain these design secrets
concealed, to not force states to choose between disarmament and compromising this classified
knowledge.
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Several arguments can be made in support of this culture of secrecy regarding nuclear arsenals.
First, if the assumption is that the United States and Russia, or previously Soviet Union, have not been
able to discover the details of each other’s nuclear arsenals through the means of intelligence, then
maintaining these details would be a strategic advantage.372 From a technical perspective, the details
of the bomb design determine the weapon’s efficiency, yield, and reliability. The parameters that are
relevant to the efficiency of nuclear weapons involve the core size, expansion rate, pressure, neutron
density, and energy dynamics.373 All of these variables change as a function of time, so the specific
mechanics of the bomb design are critical for understanding its efficiency and yield.374 Information
that would reveal these parameters can include details about warhead design and configuration, the
capabilities of specific components, the quantity and isotopic composition of the weapons material,
and other aspects relating to how the warheads operate. Sensitive information can also relate to the
warhead environment, including the launch vehicles, storage operations, and many other aspects.
Thus, a strategic argument can be made for maintaining a strict level of secrecy regarding design details.
Another strategic argument for secrecy is that knowing the design details would allow other
states develop countermeasures against the specific design characteristics of the state’s nuclear
warheads.375 For example, “neutrons, in the right quantity, can “kill” a warhead, causing its plutonium
to heat and expand, and causing its chemical high-explosives to degrade; if you knew exactly what
level of neutrons would kill a nuke, it would play into strategies of trying to defend against a nuclear
attack.”376 The revelation of design secrets would undermine nuclear deterrence, if other states would
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be able to neutralize the nuclear warheads. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the measurement
of radiographic profiles of warheads, or other intrusive verification methods, could make ‘reverseengineering’ the warhead’s exact design possible.377
Concerns about classified or sensitive information are specific to each state, due to the
differences in their government-regulated classification systems but also based on the distinct status
of their nuclear weapons program. States can be concerned that the information could be exploited
by competing states and enable them to utilize the information to enhance their capabilities, if they
perceive their capabilities superior to adversaries. On the other hand, the information can also reveal
vulnerabilities about their capabilities and provide knowledge about the performance and reliability of
the warheads, which are amplified if states regard their capabilities to be comparatively inferior or less
developed. Especially if states are still in the warhead or material build-up phase, as the states are
concerned with relative advantages to others. This could be interpreted from U.S.-Soviet relations
during the Cold War, as well as in the current conditions in India and Pakistan. In the U.S.-Russia
context, concerns about intrusiveness have decreased as the states have engaged in collaborative
disarmament measures. The absence of this history of engagement, however, is likely to make other
nuclear weapons states much more cautious regarding the revelation of design secrets.
These differences between state perceptions of confidentiality and their sensitivity to different
levels of intrusiveness in inspections should be acknowledged in the process of devising future
verification approaches for disarmament treaties. Insights about specific state concerns can inform
officials and experts of the best mechanisms in verification approaches that promote legitimacy and
confidence in the eyes of different states, advancing their willingness to cooperate in the processes of
negotiation, signature, and ratification. On the other hand, these perceptions are also malleable, which
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is visible in the U.S.-Russia disarmament history. The entire idea of accessing classified and sensitive
nuclear facilities, containing some of the most important national security capabilities that states can
possibly have, was unimaginable before the United States and the Soviet Union established precedence
in this during the Cold War. Progressively, they started opening up their facilities bilaterally for on-site
inspections, overflight and satellite monitoring, and many forms of national technical means that
enabled the buildup of trust between the two states.
This chapter illustrates how technical, political, and historical factors relate to the design of
nuclear weapons, and how a strong culture of secrecy continues to surround states’ nuclear weapons
programs. One of the key challenges for future steps in nuclear arms control is to find ways around
this veil of secrecy, acknowledging state sensitivities but also devising ways to overcome these barriers.
This challenge is particularly important for creating new verification mechanisms for individual
warheads, which is the focus of the next chapter.
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5. Zero-Knowledge Verification
I.

Introduction

As has been detailed in previous chapters, the core challenge in nuclear arms control
verification is balancing the concerns of the host state in maintaining a strict level of confidentiality,
and the interests of other involved parties in establishing confidence in the verification process. This
balance between secrecy and transparency has been discussed in relevant arms control literature and
evidenced in the negotiating dynamics of past disarmament efforts. The current verification
approaches place more significance to host state concerns, as has been evidenced in the context of
disarmament between the United States and Russia. Multilateral disarmament is likely to introduce
even deeper and complex anxieties about the confidentiality and transparency dimensions of nuclear
arms control verification processes.
The conceptualization of this balancing act as a zero-sum game, however, may be misguided.
As will be discussed in this chapter, new verification technologies and approaches can contribute to
adjusting the scale between confidentiality and transparency, enabling future disarmament verification
provisions to equalize these critical interests. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the process of
warhead verification, where state concerns about protecting classified information about warheads
and their design are contrasted with the interests of the inspecting party in ensuring the authenticity
of the measurement process. Emerging approaches that employ physical cryptographic protocols aim
to create a mechanism of high-security warhead verification where neither confidentiality or
transparency would need to be sacrificed.
This chapter will first provide a brief overview of the issues that drive the need for verification
mechanisms that focus on individual warheads, with previous chapters providing a more detailed
analysis of the historical background and past technical efforts. Next, the technical basis for physical
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cryptographic warhead verification is introduced by discussing the general cryptographic concept of
zero-knowledge proofs, and then focusing on their application in the physical domain, specifically in
the authentication of nuclear warheads. After detailing the three most advanced implementations of
these systems, the chapter will address the core unsolved challenge relating to authenticating the
reference warhead. Finally, potential solutions to this question are explored through an analysis of
relevant tools in modern cryptography and their application to analogous high-security authentication
systems.

II.

Contextualizing the Challenge

Disarmament verification is a complex interactive process that is connected to a wide range
of technical and political mechanisms, depending on the content and context of the treaty being
verified. The technical and political sides are in many ways decoupled from one another, but also
inherently interconnected. When considering what forms of verification will be needed for any given
disarmament treaty, a critical question is the informational value that the selected verification
mechanisms provide for monitoring the treaty provisions, either independently or in conjunction with
other mechanisms.378
In future agreements focused on individual warheads, the most critical questions relate to the
high-security authentication of warheads, their unique identification, and maintaining the continuity
of knowledge until they have been dismantled.379 Perhaps the most challenging one of the three is the
ability to conclusively and accurately authenticate a warhead and distinguish its type, while still
maintaining the highest level of confidentiality in the process.380 The use of verification approaches
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that would allow this are inherently intrusive and can reveal extremely detailed, classified information
about warhead design. This is a non-negotiable for nuclear weapons states, as the information could
be exploited by other states, could reveal vulnerabilities in warhead function, and would also place the
states in noncompliance with Article I in the NPT, which prohibits nuclear weapons states from
disclosing proliferation-sensitive information.381
The future of nuclear disarmament will look very different from previously applied arms
reduction mechanisms, which have not defined warheads themselves as the treaty-accountable item,
but have rather focused on delivery vehicles and launchers.382 As discussed in an earlier chapter, unique
characteristics of the U.S.-Russia context have facilitated this form of disarmament, enabling the states
to circumvent the challenge of accurately counting and verifying individual warheads. Both sides have
had a high tolerance for uncertainty in treaty limits and verification effectiveness, driven by the vast
size of their nuclear arsenals, and have been able to independently monitor compliance through
advanced capabilities in national technical means (NTM).383 Importantly, analysis of the different
negotiation circumstances illustrate that in many cases there would have been political will for deeper
reductions and wider capability coverage, if verification mechanisms had been available.
As has been detailed in an earlier chapter, few of the facilitating factors in past disarmament
processes will hold true for future disarmament, whether in the context of continued U.S.-Russia
bilateral agreements or multilateral disarmament treaties, which will make it essential to shift to a
disarmament paradigm that focuses on addressing individual warheads as the treaty-accountable item.
When discussion concerns hundreds of warheads or fewer, the tolerable margin of error diminishes.
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At these levels, verifying and tracking each individual warhead will become critical. This also involves
obtaining knowledge about the type and status of a specific warhead and being able to re-authenticate
these attributes in later stages of the dismantlement process. Agreements at these levels will also
involve new categories of warheads and items, including non-deployed and non-strategic warheads
and warhead components.384 Non-strategic warheads would be impossible to verify through previously
employed accounting methods, as these capabilities are deployed on dual-capable launchers and other
delivery systems.385 Unless the arms reduction agreements would also eliminate these dual-capable
systems, such as fighter aircraft, the only option would be to individually verify and eliminate
warheads.386 In either case, defining individual warheads as the treaty-accountable item becomes
essential when arms control negotiations start addressing nuclear warheads in storage, whether
strategic or non-strategic.387

III.

Past Verification Approaches

The verification mechanisms in the INF, START I and II, and New START have started to
approach the issue of individual warhead verification. Importantly, however, the verification
provisions thus far have been a binary true/false measurement of the absence of a nuclear warhead.388
These agreements do not allow the use of radiation detection equipment to confirm an object to be
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nuclear, let alone more specific information about warhead characteristics or configuration. 389 As
disarmament continues, this may become a key capability requirement for verification provisions,
driven by the need to distinguish warheads or their components based on their type or characteristics,
not only their nuclear or non-nuclear nature.390
Prior efforts to overcome this challenge have explored the use of an attribute verification
approach, combined with information barriers that employ complex algorithmic mechanisms
embedded to the equipment software or hardware.391 Attribution verification intends to authenticate
a warhead by confirming that the claimed item conforms to a pre-defined set of characteristics, such
as the presence of nuclear material, its isotopic composition, and mass above a certain threshold. 392
One of the challenges with this approach is whether it can use sufficiently targeted attributes to
authenticate and distinguish warheads.393 The selected attributes must be unclassified, as they are
known to all involved parties, which limits the options that could be considered.394 States may be
concerned that by defining the specific attributes of a certain treaty-limited warhead, they would be
disclosing too detailed information about their design and functional characteristics. In the case of the
INF Treaty, for example, the United States needed to provide detailed information that would allow
the differentiation between the treaty-accountable SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the
non-limited SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles.395 The challenge was that the missile types used
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the same first stages, including engines and fuel tanks, and were indistinguishable based on external
characteristics.396 In this case, determining the crude fingerprint with a simple neutron detector was
sufficient to distinguish the missiles accurately and was acceptable to both the United States and the
Soviet Union.397 Identifying and distinguishing other types of treaty-accountable items, however, may
require much more detailed information. The use of non-nuclear attributes has also been proposed in
differentiating between weapons types, but these may also be classified and thus unavailable for use
as attributes.398
The attribute verification approach makes it essential to use information barriers to protect
the measurement information. This, however, also makes the measurement system inaccessible to the
verifier and thus makes it difficult to establish trust in the obtained data.399 These requirements result
in highly complex systems, making it difficult to simultaneously achieve equipment certification by the
host and authentication by the inspector.400 For information protection purposes, the information
barrier used in the Trilateral Initiative contained a threshold comparison analyzer, an output data
barrier, a security status monitor, cabinets and cable shielding, and other structures that intended to
protect the measurement information.401 For data collection, the system employed a multiplicity shift
register and a multichannel analyzer, as well as an input data barrier, that aimed to ensure legitimate
data collection capability.402 The host concern with the analysis equipment and software, however, is
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that extraneous code could be integrated to the system.403 In addition, these systems must be used
with trusted processors, which must adhere to equally strict requirements for non-intrusiveness,
transparency, and authenticity, and validity.404 Mistrust in the use of information barriers also emerges
at the processor level, as reflected in Russia’s engagement in developing their own trusted processor
design based on a specific set of priorities.405
Information barriers are necessary for the system’s ability to protect information, but on the
other hand, also make certifying and authenticating the equipment very difficult. This may be
technically feasible, especially as their development goes further. From a political perspective,
however, this complexity and lack of transparency could be used against them. It would be easy to
argue – as the Russians did towards the end of the Trilateral Initiative – that they will require a
significant amount of time to certify the equipment, and even then, they may not be able to gain
sufficient confidence that it would not conduct proscribed measurements or collect the data
clandestinely. This time burden and trust deficiency could eventually be used as a reason to disqualify
these systems from actual use, which would facilitate a justification for not proceeding with
disarmament. This highlights the dual-use nature of verification as a political tool – it can be used as
a confidence-building asset, but also as a means of fostering suspicions.
The template approach employs a different strategy in warhead verification, relying on
differential measurements between an inspected item and one that is known to be authentic. 406 The
basic axiom is that if an item is sufficiently similar, in ideal conditions identical, to a warhead that has
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previously been proven as authentic, it can legitimately be declared as a warhead as well. 407
Comparative measurement systems based on the template approach can be designed to be simpler
and easier to authenticate and certify, but in traditional template verification systems, information
barriers are still needed to protect the collected data.408 These past efforts to develop template-based
approaches include the Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) by the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory; the Controlled Intrusiveness Verification Technology (CIVET) system, developed by the
Brookhaven National Laboratory; the Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS) by the Sandia
National Laboratories; and the Next Generation Trusted Radiation Identification System (NG-TRIS)
by Sandia as well.409 The development of these systems has also been driven by the need of nuclear
weapons states to identify their own warheads.410 These measurements systems have a demonstrated
ability to distinguish between warhead and component types, but all of them rely on information
barriers and as a Russian assessment of the CIVET system shows, important concerns about
intrusions remain.411 Particularly, the systems preserve the template data, which represents the
classified warhead signature and thus needs to be protected throughout the verification process.412
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Most systems developed thus far have used gamma-ray or neutron spectra as the signature, but it
would be possible to use other, non-nuclear characteristics as well.413
Novel verification protocols developed in the past several years have overcome the use of
information barriers by employing physical measurement methods that inherently protect classified
information.414 These protocols employ physical cryptography to protect classified information,
conforming to the idea of zero-knowledge proofs. Their strength in circumventing the use of
information barriers by using the zero-knowledge property, however, has also created challenges that
remain unsolved. First, while these novel approaches push the issue of information protection from
electronic barriers to physical ones, all implementations thus far require the host to maintain some
aspects of the measurement system secret in order to maintain the zero-knowledge property of the
protocol. Second, all the current implementations of these protocols are based on template verification
protocols, which rely on the use of an authentic reference warhead. Even if the measurements
conclusively prove that the two compared items are identical, this result doesn’t provide assurance of
the authenticity of the reference warhead. This ‘golden warhead’ challenge remains the core challenge
in all template verification systems, whether based on traditional or zero-knowledge protocols.

IV.

General Idea of Zero-Knowledge Proofs in Cryptography

Goldwasser et al. introduced interactive proof systems for the first time in 1985, establishing a
computational complexity measure that would determine how much additional knowledge is needed,
apart from the end result, to prove a theorem to be true.415 The insight was that interaction between
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the prover and the verifier would allow this to be zero in an ideal case, constituting a zero-knowledge
proof.416 The main application of these proofs are in cryptographic protocols, which are
communication mechanisms that ensure the confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of
interactions in an insecure environment.417 When cryptographic protocols employ zero-knowledge
proofs, the authentication of a statement or other exchange of knowledge is done without revealing
the underlying solution or any additional information.418
Three important properties apply to all zero-knowledge proofs – completeness, soundness,
and zero-knowledge.419 In the ideal case, these properties are fully true, but in non-ideal conditions
they exist on a probabilistic distribution, defining a completeness error and a soundness error for the
protocol.420 Completeness refers to the fact that an honest verifier can always be convinced of the
truthfulness of a genuinely true statement by an honest prover. Thus, with perfect completeness, the
likelihood of false negatives is zero. Soundness, on the other hand, controls for false positives – if a
statement is false, a cheating prover could not prove it to be true to an honest verifier. As with
completeness, however, soundness is not necessarily perfect. Lastly, the zero-knowledge aspect
certifies that even when cheating, the verifier cannot learn any information about a correct proof or
from an honest prover.421
Commitment protocol is another important dimension of zero-knowledge proofs.422 Here, the
first party to an interaction commits to some value, which remains hidden to the second party
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throughout the proof process. After the proof has been completed, however, the two parties can
decide to reveal or decommit the value. This enables the second party to learn the value and ensure
that it was what was originally agreed. This leads to binding, meaning that after the second party knows
the unique value, it is impossible for the first party to change it.423

V.

Physical Zero-Knowledge Proofs

The concept of zero-knowledge proofs can also be applied to propositions relating to the
physical world.424 In this context, zero-knowledge proofs verify propositions about physical properties
of objects without revealing any information apart from the true/false result. Physical zero-knowledge
proofs can be carried out without the involvement of computers, only through human-aided
implementation of the protocol in question. This is a key feature of the protocols, addressing the
confidentiality and integrity issues that the involvement of computers may create. It is also possible to
construct hybrid systems that are based on human-implemented systems that are also complemented
by hardware, such as physical measurement systems. Only one of the parties has full access to the
considered object and the measurement system, with the intent of keeping them out of bounds to the
verifier but still being able to verify the obtained results.425
Physical zero-knowledge proofs can be formalized using Universally Composable (UC)
security framework, under which a physical protocol is separated into a logical and physical layer.426
The logical layer exists in a hybrid world, which is essentially a reduced and abstracted version of the
real world. The physical measurements of the protocol only interact with the physical layer, but any
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interaction at this level also creates an effect on the logical layer in the hybrid reality. The verifier has
access only to this logical layer, but the universal composition property implies that the knowledge
obtained from this layer also reflects the nature of the physical layer. Thus, the properties of zeroknowledge proofs – completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge – can be computed at the level of
the logical layer. As any statement that is valid on the logical level in the hybrid world is also valid in
the physical world, the inspector also can be convinced of the correctness or incorrectness of the
original proposition in the real world.427

VI.

Application to Warheads

Applying the idea of physical zero-knowledge proofs to warhead verification could be
instrumental for addressing the conflict between state interests in confidentiality and inspector
concerns about transparency.428 When applied in this context, the host state serves in the role of the
prover, and the inspecting agent or agency conforms to the role of the verifier.429 The nature of the
propositions, relating to warhead properties, defines the conditions of the protocol and could
theoretically represent either an attribute or template verification approach. Proving a proposition
such as “The fissile material at the core of this warhead has a ratio of
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𝑃𝑢 to

239

𝑃𝑢 of less than 0.1 and thus

represents an authentic warhead” would represent an attribution statement, derived from the conditions
defined in the Trilateral Initiative, and could be assessed using physical zero-knowledge proofs.430 The
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statement “The radiographic signature of this warhead is statistically indistinguishable from that of a pre-authenticated
warhead of the same type and thus the warhead is authentic,” on the other hand, would refer to a template
verification protocol and could similarly be proven using physical zero-knowledge proofs.431
The concept of physical zero-knowledge proofs from this abstract mathematical level has been
demonstrated in practice using the template verification approach.432 These proposals employ physical
measurement systems that inherently protect the sensitive information contained by warheads. These
measurement systems are non-electronic, which prevents interference and tampering with the system
before, during, or after the measurement.433 The approaches have been proven capable of achieving
the principles of completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge in the correct conditions.434 As
discussed earlier, the last principle only remains true if the host maintains honesty.435 Thus, the zeroknowledge property requires the host to follow the procedure, but it is resistant to verifier cheating –
no sensitive information can be leaked even if the verifier does not follow the protocol.436

VII.

Neutron Radiographic Profile Comparison

The idea proposed by Glaser et al. from Princeton University employs differential
measurements of the neutron radiographic profiles of warheads.437 As was discussed in the previous
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chapter, neutron radiographs are created by allowing neutrons to penetrate material and then
measuring this transmission with detectors on the other side of the object. The system used in this
approach does not record the neutron signatures of the two warheads being compared, but instead
utilizes superheated emulsion detectors as a proxy for carrying out the comparison.438 These emulsion
detectors are made of superheated octafluorocyclobutane (C4F8) that are made to be sensitive to
neutrons above 1 MeV, but insensitive to gamma radiation.439 In addition, the emulsion detectors do
not reveal information about neutron multiplicity, only about neutron fluence.440 When neutrons that
pass through the inspected object interact with the superheated emulsion, macroscopic bubbles are
generated in the emulsion matrix.441 This is because the matrix is in a meta-stable state and contains
specific sites that can undergo vaporization when a small amount of energy enters the system, such as
through a neutron.442 Thus, the neutron radiographs of the warheads are manifested as ‘bubbles’ on
the superheated emulsion detectors. These bubbles can be counted with magnetic resonance imaging
or optical tomography, and the neutron count in each detector is reflected as a pixel in the final
image.443 The detectors can be certified at any point by using a calibrated neutron source, or using a
test object to check the calibration data given by the host state.444
The neutron source used in the system is a 14 MeV collimated neutron beam, with a 4-minute
exposure time that creates a maximum of 1,200 bubbles (Nmax), with some variance inherent to the
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measurement system. This system is depicted in Figure 5.1. The 14 MeV neutrons were decided on
the basis that these penetrating high-energy neutrons are sensitive enough for differences both in
geometric conformation and material composition of the warhead.445 Neutrons at this energy,
however, may not be able to sufficiently distinguish between fissile and fissionable materials, but
combining the use of 250 keV neutrons could solve this potential challenge.446 The neutron source
used was a deuterium-tritium neutron generator, which yields approximately 108 neutrons per
second.447 The exposure time is dependent on what the target number, Nmax, of bubbles is, which also
determines the confidence level in the experiment. The variance associated with the detectors is shown
in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.1. The system design incorporates the principle of template approach (a), superheated
emulsion detectors (b), neutron radiography (c), and positional variance (d). Source: Sébastien
Philippe, Robert Goldston, Alexander Glaser, and Francesco d’Errico, “A physical zero-knowledge
object-comparison system for nuclear warhead verification,” Nature Communications 7 (2016), 3.
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Figure 5.2. The variance associated with the superheated emulsion detectors. Source: Sébastien
Philippe, Robert Goldston, Alexander Glaser, and Francesco d’Errico, “A physical zero-knowledge
object-comparison system for nuclear warhead verification,” Nature Communications 7 (2016), 6.
The fluence response function, ƒ reflects the relationship between neutron interactions,
whose number depends on the neutron fluence that arrived at the detector, and the resulting bubble
count. This establishes the calibration of the equipment, which can be certified by the inspector at any
point. After this, unique radiographs of warheads can be measured, determined by its configuration,
shielding, and material properties, and with the measurements being dependent on the fluence
response function. The complimentary radiographs can be created through an inverse of the fluence
response function.448
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In the first stage of the protocol, the complement neutron radiograph of the reference warhead
is preloaded into the detector.449 This pre-loading phase is done privately by the host, without inspector
access to the system. Next, the inspected warhead is irradiated, with the resulting signature being added
to the preloaded detectors. If the two warheads are sufficiently similar – in the optimal case, identical
– the inverse signature that was preloaded, and the newly measured signature, should complement
each other and the end result should be essentially a blank reading, only reflecting the Poisson noise
in the measurement environment. This is because the spread of neutrons is inherently governed by
Poisson statistics, similar to many other physical measurement data.450 Any deviation from this should
be due to the statistical error in the measurement process, which can be corrected partially via
calibration, or the small variance in the reference radiographs. The ability to repeat the measurements,
however, allows the inspector to determine the acceptable margin for error for false positives and
negatives.451
Experimental results from the verification approach are shown in Figures 5.3-5.6. Figure 5.3,
panel a, shows the difference between a valid item and different diversion scenarios, and has been
corrected for occultation, or the fact that some of the bubbles are hidden in the bubble counting
process.452 It is evident that the spoofs can be distinguished from the valid item, with each diversion
scenario providing a different pattern. Panel b shows how the experimental results compare with the
computational Monte Carlo simulations.

449

Ibid.

MIT Department of Physics, “Poisson Statistics,” July 8, 2004, available at
http://123.physics.ucdavis.edu/week_0_files/Poisson.pdf.
450

William Noonan, “Neutrons: It Is All in the Timing – The Physics of Nuclear Fission Chains and Their Detection,”
Johns Hopkins Applied Technical Digest 32, no. 5 (2014): 766, available at http://techdigest.jhuapl.edu/TD/td3205/32_05Noonan.pdf.
451 Philippe, Goldston, Glaser, and d’Errico, “A physical zero-knowledge object-comparison system for nuclear
warhead verification.”
452

Ibid., 6.

133

Figure 5.3. Experimental results from detector exposure (a) and comparison to Monte Carlo
simulations (b). Source: Sébastien Philippe, Robert Goldston, Alexander Glaser, and Francesco
d’Errico, “A physical zero-knowledge object-comparison system for nuclear warhead verification,”
Nature Communications 7 (2016), 5.
134

As was discussed before, neutron counts on the detectors can be reflected as pixels to form
an image. This is reflected in Figure 5.4, where the resulting images of the detector arrays are shown.
When the comparison of the reverse radiograph of the template (middle image) is subtracted from a
valid item (left), only Poisson noise would be visible in the resulting comparison. If this reverse
radiograph is compared to a significantly different spoof item, the resulting comparison will reflect
this. These diversion scenarios are shown in Figure 5.5. These results show that any modifications to
the reference or the inspected item, both in terms of configuration or material composition, could be
detected. Importantly, the physical implementation of the system did not reveal the underlying
information about identical items, reflecting the zero-knowledge nature of the system.453

Figure 5.4. The comparison of a valid and invalid item based on the template approach. Source:
Alexander Glaser, Boaz Barak, and Rob Goldston, “A New Approach to Nuclear Warhead
Verification Using a Zero-Knowledge Protocol,” INMM 53rd Annual Meeting (2012), 8.
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Figure 5.5. The Monte Carlo simulation results from a match scenario and three diversion
scenarios. Source: Alexander Glaser, Boaz Barak, and Rob Goldston, “A New Approach to Nuclear
Warhead Verification Using a Zero-Knowledge Protocol,” INMM 53rd Annual Meeting (2012), 8.
Inspector and host interaction with the system is a critical dimension of the implementation
of the approach.454 After the preloading is done, the host must offer a certain number of pre-loaded
detectors and their calibration data to the inspector, who randomly chooses which ones are used in
the measurements. The rest can still be tested for their proper functionality. In addition, the protocol
also involves several warheads that could be chosen for verification by the inspector. Since the host
claims that all of the warheads are of the same type as the reference warhead(s), then any combination
should result in a valid result. The randomization facilitated by these two choice conditions is intended
to prevent the host from modifying the reference warhead such that it would match the warhead being
verified. In addition, both parties are allowed to monitor the source neutron fluence to ensure that the
agreed amount is being transmitted to the detector.455 Overall, the zero-knowledge nature of the
system is dependent on the host following the protocol, as the host must offer a warhead that matches
the template in order to prevent any information from being revealed. If this is not the case, the
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resulting bubble count, Nmax, will differ from the expected one, and may convey sensitive
information.456

VIII. Isotopic Tomography Approach
A second implementation of a physical cryptographic system, proposed by Kemp et al. from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has important conceptual similarities with the approach
proposed by Glaser et al., but also clear differences. The approach is based on the proposition that if
a warhead is identical, or sufficiently identical, to an authentic warhead configurationally, spatially,
isotopically, and is otherwise comparable in macroscopic features, then it is an authentic warhead as
well. While there can be microstructural differences that are not captured by these comparison points,
it would be exceedingly difficult to manufacture a mock warhead that would only diverge from the
authentic warhead at a microscopic level. Thus, the appropriate physical measurement system must
be able to accurately determine these macroscopic features, but it does not need to distinguish
microscopic structure.457
The system of choice is isotopic tomography, which allows the determination of the
distribution of each isotope present in the warhead and creates a single-pixel radiograph of the
template and inspected warheads, with the measurements taken at random orientations.458 The
measurement system is shown in Figure 5.6 and 5.7. The two signatures are created through threedimensional information, but the reduction of the image conceals the actual spatial composition of
the objects. The isotopic tomogram, depicting the warhead, is created through transmission nuclearresonance fluorescence that employs a monoenergetic high-energy X-ray beam. In simulations of the
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system, a bremsstrahlung X-ray source was used as a photon source, which is not ideal from the
perspective of information processing or radiation dose, but other options are also available.459

Figure 5.6. The system design in the Kemp et al. approach. Source: R. Scott Kemp et al., Figure S.3,
“Supporting Information Physical Cryptographic Veriﬁcation of Nuclear Warheads,” for R. Scott
Kemp et al., “Physical Cryptographic Verification of Nuclear Warheads.” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 113 (2016): 8618–8623.

Figure 5.7. The system design in the Kemp et al. approach. Source: R. Scott Kemp et al., “Physical
Cryptographic Verification of Nuclear Warheads,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113
(2016): 8619.

Bremsstrahlung or ‘braking’ radiation refers to x-rays generated when decelerating electrons (for example, those
hitting a metal) emit electromagnetic radiation.
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The warhead contains a large number of nuclei from different elements, each of which will
absorb photons of certain energy from the beam, based on their unique absorption spectrum. These
spectra are unique to each isotope and can thus be used to identify each material. The confluence of
these interactions between the beam and the warhead materials, reflected as absorption lines in the
beam spectrum, depends on the structural and isotopic features of the warhead.460 When these
measurements are repeated at different orientations, the overall geometry of the warhead is produced.
This information contained in the beam, however, is not directly collected by the measurement system,
as it would reveal the warhead structure. The beam travels through foils, which are composed of the
isotopes of interest at different concentration levels and thus also interact with the beam. Some of the
photons in the beam are still at energy levels that can be absorbed by the foil nuclei, if a resonant
isotope is present. When the excited foil nuclei return to the ground state, a gamma ray is emitted.
This nuclear-resonance fluorescence, which is a function of both the warhead and foil characteristics,
is detected by high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors and constitutes the final, unclassified results.
Using the same foil, but measuring different items, thus enables the comparison of these results and
determines whether or not the objects are identical.461
Sensitive information is inherently protected by the system, as long as the composition of the
foil remains secret.462 Thus, the foil serves the role of a one-time-pad physical encryption key. The foil
is created by the host, who maintains possession of the device throughout the measurement process
and discards it after the process has been completed. The foils should contain a minimum level of all
agreed isotopes and thus produce a minimum signal in the final results, which allows the inspector to
certify the sensitivity of the foil. The inspector leads the measurement process and defines the specific
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measurement orientations, which constitutes one obstacle to cheating from the host side.463 In this
method, similar to the previously described neutron-based approach, confidence can be built through
having a large number of reference and inspected warheads available from which the inspector will
choose.
Simulations of the system illustrate that it is able to detect several spoof scenarios, including
some that may be indiscernible through other radiological techniques.464 In general, information
protection is inherent to the physical processes used by the system, but some concerns remain about
the inspector’s ability to discern estimations of the foil or the warhead’s composition. These can be
managed through different physical and mathematical approaches, enabling a level of confidence that
is acceptable in practical conditions. The system has not been demonstrated in a real setting, however,
which creates both opportunities and challenges.
One important concern in this approach is that the foil, or the physical cryptographic key, is
completely inaccessible to the verifier. Compared to the previous approach, which constructed a
physical template through the superheated emulsion detectors, this does not provide anything tangible
for the inspector to assess after the measurement. This could be a concern, if the inspector wanted to
certify that no interference had taken place during the process.
A critical challenge in both the Glaser et al. and Kemp et al. approaches is that the template
and the instrumentation becomes inaccessible to the inspector after they have been prepared for
measurement.465 Both ideas pre-load the measurement system with sensitive information, which also
rules out inspector access to the system after the measurement has been completed. In the Glaser et
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al. proposal, the host preloads a reverse radiographic signature to the detector, which is not revealed
to the inspector. Furthermore, the positive result would be a null result within a certain margin of
error, which would not allow the inspector to understand what the starting point was. In the Kemp et
al. proposal, the host constructs the foil and maintains its composition as a secret throughout the
experiment, discarding it after use. These approaches make it impossible for the inspector to
authenticate the template or the measurement system after the conclusion of the measurement
process.466

IX.

Two-Dimensional Imaging Approach

A third approach developed by Marleau et al. at the Sandia National Laboratories intends to
solve this challenge by not preloading the system with any sensitive information.467 This would allow
the inspector to authenticate the instrumentation post-measurement, which would provide confidence
that there was no interference during the measurement process. The system still conforms to the
principle of zero-knowledge proofs by not measuring sensitive information during the process. A key
difference to the previous approaches is also that the blank result is maintained throughout the
dynamic measurement process, as opposed to only becoming evident at the end. This could enable
the verifier to interact with the system during the measurement process, not only in assessing the end
results.468
The system combines a two-dimensional time-encoded imaging (2D-TEI) system and a
neutron-emitting source to create a high-resolution radiograph of the items under measurement.469
This system is shown in Figure 5.8. This measurement concept is referred to as CONFIDANTE
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(CONfirmation using a Fast-neutron Imaging Detector with Anti-image NULL-positive Time
Encoding), highlighting the fact that no information barriers are needed in the measurement process.
The 2D-TEI is a cylindrical coded mask, composed of high density polyethylene, that rotates around
the item under measurement. In the center, there are one or more deep liquid scintillator cells, which
serve as the detector pixel. These pixels are time-encoded, with the rate being modulated by the mask
rotation. Here, the information about the radiation fields produced by the warheads is composed into
the coded mask, which is essentially a manifestation of the warhead design and composition.470 This
is shown in Figure 5.9.

Figure 5.8. The system design for the Marleau et al. approach. Source: Peter Marleau and Erik
Brubaker, “An Implementation of Zero Knowledge Confirmation using a Two-dimensional TimeEncoded Imaging System,” INMM 57th Annual Meeting (2016): 3.
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Figure 5.9. The principle of the two-dimensional imaging system. Source: Peter Marleau and Erik
Brubaker, “An Implementation of Zero Knowledge Confirmation using a Two-dimensional TimeEncoded Imaging System,” INMM 57th Annual Meeting (2016): 5
Similar to the Glaser et al. method, the system protects sensitive information by superimposing
the reverse measurement result of the reference warhead with the measurements obtained from the
inspected warhead.471 The reverse result has the opposite modulation from the other result. In practice,
the comparison is carried out by constructing the mask out of two parts, with the first half of the mask
pattern being the anti-mask of the reference warhead and the second half the mask of the inspected
warhead. The cylindrical mask is placed between the two warheads under measurement. As the
cylindrical mask rotates, the signals are superimposed, with the contributions from each direction
varying as a function of the measurement angle. Since the signals from the two warheads are
complements of each other, the resulting signal should always be the same (blank) independent of the
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rotation angle. The resulting signal should only reflect random noise that is inherent to any physical
measurement system.472
Modeling this system with two identical items creates a count value distribution that is similar
to expected random noise (Poisson noise).473 The variance between the noise in the measurement
results and an ideal Poisson distribution is reflected in the Feynman Y value, which essentially
measures how Poisson-like the noise is. In the ideal case, where the noise consists only of statistical
noise, the Feynman Y value should be zero. Experimentally, comparing two identical items produces
a result very close to that.474 Experimental results of the system are shown in Figures 5.10 and 5.11.
Knowledge of the count distribution, however, would not allow the reconstruction of the original
source distributions, since the signal is a summation of complements. This is only true, however, if
the two measured items are identical and symmetrically aligned. In the case that only one item is
present, or that the two measured items are very different in configuration, it is possible to infer the
source configurations based on the measurement data. This may create the risk of information
disclosure, including in situations where two identical warheads are improperly situated vis-à-vis the
cylinder.475 Thus, the count distribution may need to be modified through sequestration or other
means to prevent any information being accidentally or purposefully revealed in the process.476
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Figure 5.10. Simulation results. Source: Peter Marleau and Erik Brubaker, “An Implementation of
Zero Knowledge Confirmation using a Two-dimensional Time-Encoded Imaging System,” INMM
57th Annual Meeting (2016): 6.

Figure 5.11. Simulation results. Source: Peter Marleau and Erik Brubaker, “An Implementation of
Zero Knowledge Confirmation using a Two-dimensional Time-Encoded Imaging System,” INMM
57th Annual Meeting (2016): 7.
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One benefit of the system design is also that it serves as a full imaging system, capturing all
radiation sources in the measurement environment.477 This creates an opportunity for the inspector to
control the measurement conditions, for example by inserting an additional radiation source that can
be checked during the result analysis. When the source is placed symmetrically with respect to the two
measured items, it does not interfere with their comparison, but adds an additional measurement
result. The system function, thus, could be authenticated through this control radiation source. Other
aspects of the system also support authentication by the inspector, including that the system is
accessible before and after the measurement is done, since no information about the test items is preloaded into the system.478
Both of these system characteristics also lend confidence to the host’s certification assessment.
If the total signal strength measured by the system is considered to be sensitive, the host could be
allowed to place an additional radiation source, whose value is only known by the host, above the
detector pixel and thus offset the measurement signal such that the contributions from the two
measured items would remain confidential.479

X.

Authenticating the Reference Warhead

These physical cryptographic protocols based on the zero-knowledge property do not rely on
electronic information barriers that can be impossible to authenticate for the verifier.480 Thus, they are
able to solve one of the key challenges that all previous verification systems, both attribute- and
template-based, have faced. Physical cryptographic verification systems inherently protect sensitive
information based on the measurement technologies employed in the protocols, which never measure
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the sensitive information itself.481 Proper design can ensure easy certification and authentication of the
systems for all parties involved and can theoretically be implemented with any equipment, making the
issue of host- or verifier-supply insignificant.482
The most significant challenge with the current implementations of physical cryptographic
verification approaches, as with all template-based verification systems, relates to the question of
trusting the reference warhead.483 In all forms of template verification, an authentic ‘golden warhead’
must be established, allowing the comparison of this reference to an item under inspection.484 When
considering this challenge, one important question relates to terminology. In the traditional template
approach literature, the reference measurement, not the item, is considered as the template. In the
context of warhead verification, this would translate to considering the radiological signature or other
measurement result of the warhead as the template, not the physical reference warhead itself.485
Neither the Glaser et al. or Kemp et al. proposals, however, establish a template in the same
way as traditional template verification systems do.486 The Glaser et al. approach uses the preloaded
reverse radiographs as templates of a different kind, but as discussed earlier, those are not accessible
or authenticable to the inspector. The preload data is classified, in the same sense as a template behind
an information barrier. The Kemp et al. approach does not establish anything comparable to a template
– the reference warhead is always used as the template. This makes maintaining continuity of

481

Ibid., 9.

482

Ibid..

483

Marleau et al., “Zero Knowledge Protocol: Challenges and Opportunities,” 5.

484

Ibid.

485

Ibid.

Marleau and Brubaker, “An Implementation of Zero Knowledge Confirmation using a Two-dimensional TimeEncoded Imaging System,” 2.
486

147

knowledge of the reference warhead essential for the protocols, since the legitimacy of the comparison
is contingent on the warhead’s authenticity.
The Marleau et al. proposal does not preload any sensitive information to the system and thus
enables the inspector access to the instrumentation at all times, but it also circumvents the
establishment of a traditional template.487 This approach is very similar to Glaser et al. in the sense that
a measurement and its complement are compared to each other, with a confirmatory result being a
blank. The challenge with these approaches, however, is that the inspector cannot access the data that
produced this result – it only confirms that the reference item was identical to the inspected item.
This, of course, is the core idea of zero-knowledge protocols and allows the protection of sensitive
information. On the other hand, it also prevents the assessment of the authenticity of the reference
warhead.
Several ideas have been proposed for ensuring the authenticity of the reference warhead. The
inspector could be allowed to select the reference warhead from active delivery systems, as states
would be highly unlikely to deploy counterfeit warheads in these conditions and undermine the
weapons’ deterrent capability.488 Deception mechanisms are still conceivable, for example a situation
where the host state learns beforehand which actively deployed warheads would be selected as
templates and can replace them with blanks. Furthermore, this template selection mechanism could
not be used for non-strategic nuclear warheads deployed in dual-capable systems, or those located in
storage. Chain of custody methods could be one possible solution, but states may be unwilling to allow
this level of access to their critical defense facilities and information.489 As discussed in a previous
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chapter, START I and New START contained provisions for verifying the non-nuclear nature of
warheads through radiological measurements, but confidentiality concerns prevented more intrusive
measurements on nuclear warheads.
XI.

Future Directions

The fundamental assumption in zero-knowledge verification protocols is that no information
should be released, or even measured, beyond the validity of the proposition under consideration.
This property makes it inherently impossible to infer anything about the reference warhead. Would it
be possible to allow some measurement information to be accessible to the verifier, however, for the
purpose of authenticating the reference warhead? Relaxing the condition of zero-knowledge could
open new opportunities for solving the ‘golden warhead’ challenge. Verification protocols that rely on
electronic information barriers aim to do this by allowing the measurement of classified information,
but then concealing it behind a trusted information barrier and only displaying an unclassified result.490
This gain in the legitimacy of the measurement results, however, comes with the increased vulnerability
to intricate spoofing attempts from either the host or the verifier.491 Thus, both mechanisms of
information integrity have inherent tradeoffs. Creating a verification system that would integrate both
the attribute approach and the template approach could be one potential way to balance the different
advantages and obstacles.492
As mentioned earlier, the core criteria for selecting the methods used in verification protocols
should be the questions they are able to answer, either alone or in parallel with other verification
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mechanisms.493 This informational value can justify the use of a particular mechanism, but this
justification must be perceived as legitimate by all involved parties in the treaty. Reflecting back to
mechanisms based on information barriers, their ability to provide information about the legitimacy
of the measurement result – potentially, that a warhead is authentic based on the parameters defined
by the verifier – could be a justification for involving this approach in authenticating the reference
warhead. Integrating some form of measurement of the reference warhead behind an information
barrier to a physical zero-knowledge verification protocol, thus, could be a powerful way of solving
the ‘golden warhead’ challenge.
The question is, then, what should be measured about the reference warhead to establish
confidence in its authenticity. These forms of information can be categorized in three groups – basic
information, quantitative information, and disarmament information.494 In the Trilateral Initiative, the
United States and Russia followed a modest and careful approach, essentially establishing the lowest
common denominator in deciding what characteristics could be determined. They agreed to measure
three attributes that would provide basic information about the warheads and thus provide assurance
of warhead authenticity: whether fissile material was present; whether its isotopic composition was
typical for nuclear weapons; and whether the mass of the fissile material was above a minimum
threshold, defined by the context where it was deployed.495
These attributes, however, only establish basic information about the warhead and remain at
the lowest ladder of informational value. A further step into certifying the authenticity of a warhead
would be using measurement approaches that provide quantitative information about the fissile
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material: the establishment of the exact mass of the material; or certification that the mass is within
certain limits.496 Going beyond fissile material, the last category of questions would probe into the
fundamental characteristics of ‘warheadedness’: whether the object contains core nuclear weapons
components, such as the physics package, pits, or secondaries; and whether the specific model of these
components can be identified and confirmed.497
Negotiating the levels and characteristics that could be determined to authenticate the
reference warhead will be an important, but challenging task. Nuclear weapons states have highly
divergent classification standards in relation to their nuclear capabilities, as well as different decisionmaking mechanisms for determining what can and cannot be considered. If something is considered
acceptable by policy-makers, different declassification procedures may be needed before the reference
warhead authentication provision could be included in a verification protocol. The history of
declassification actions related to restricted information about the U.S. nuclear capabilities provides
an important example of shifts in classification considerations.498 This collection of unclassified
characteristics and information about warheads could be used as a basis for negotiating authentication
measures for the reference warhead used in verification protocols. These authentication measures
could be based on warhead signatures established from radiation measurements, with the declassified
characteristics offering several options for consideration.499
One potential mechanism would be to establish a database of the radiation signatures of the
state’s declared types of warheads, which would be then used in the process of authenticating the
reference warheads used in the inspection process. This is not entirely unprecedented, the United
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States has engaged in collecting a comprehensive database of its nuclear warhead and component
signatures with a potential disarmament verification purpose in mind.500 Starting in 2012, this has been
done in collaboration with the United Kingdom in the form of a modeling and measuring campaign
that intends to establish a comprehensive signature database of warheads and components. 501 The
effort seems to be ongoing, having been iterated in the 2015 NPT Review Conference.502 Expanding
dialogue on this effort to other nuclear weapons states could be the next step. A potential starting
point for implementation could also be the collection of partial signatures of the warhead types that
would first come under arms reduction negotiations.503
This mechanism would create similar concerns as with all previous attribute-based verification
approaches. While states may be compelled to relax their classification protocols related to certain
nuclear warhead characteristics to enable the authentication of the reference warhead and its type, they
would still seek mechanisms to maintain restriction of this information and only allow its disclosure
under necessary and legitimate conditions. This would entail the use of a secure arrangement that
would allow the information to flow between a protected and an open state. The base case would be
that the information is concealed, but under certain managed access conditions during reference
warhead authentication, it could be disclosed to authorized officials. In the most optimal case, the
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warhead signature data would never be directly accessed in the reference warhead authentication
process.
If a warhead signature was established through radiographic measurements, one potential
approach to hide sensitive design information would be to blur or defocus the radiograph’s spatial
resolution.504 Some measurement data in combination with image-reconstruction algorithms, however,
could allow the regeneration of the high-resolution version of the signature if the signal-to-noise ratio
was sufficient.505 Other image reduction techniques could be considered to transform the
measurement data only contain non-sensitive features, such as histogram comparison, material
recognition, and active/passive pixel correlation.506 Other alternative imaging information protection
techniques include controlled image formation and constrained image analysis, neither of which
constructs a full image in the traditional sense through the available imaging data.507
Modern cryptography contains several concepts that could prove useful for this challenge,
basing their security on mathematical operations.508 Kemp et al. implemented the idea of a physical
encryption key in the verification protocol, but only on the side of the host.509 The classified foil,
whose composition is only known to the host, serves as a physical encryption key that allows the
decryption of the measurement data.510 Cryptographic protocols, however, have established a much
wider range of ways to use encryption keys and other mechanisms in protecting sensitive information.
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In the context of warhead verification, an encryption key that allowed the inspector to certify the
underlying data could be a critical confidence-building mechanism, potentially allowing the
indisputable authentication of the reference warhead.511 Novel concepts in modern cryptography
include arrangements such as digital signatures, physically unclonable functions, and quantum key
distribution.512 In the context of zero-knowledge cryptographic protocols, different physical and nonphysical protection techniques have also been suggested.513 Evaluation of fully homomorphic
encryption has been initiated in the specific context of arms control, but overall, the consideration of
all of these cryptographic information protection mechanisms are at very elementary stages.514
One interesting analogy to the challenge of reference warhead authentication are biometric
authentication systems, which face several similar challenges as the radiological signature system under
discussion. Biometric verification systems are based on template databases of different physical
signatures or characteristics, such as fingerprints or iris scans, which are used to uniquely identify
individuals.515 These systems are designed to manage nonuniform and irregular data and tolerate some
level of error in the measurements, as the physical signatures obtained from individuals can vary
depending on the measurement conditions.516 This is done by employing mechanisms such as secure
sketches and fuzzy extractors, which allow the valid identification of nonuniform inputs. 517 A very
similar challenge would also be faced when matching the reference warhead to its type in the database,
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as any physical measurement will contain some level of uncertainty. In addition, the reference
warheads are not necessarily perfect matches to their legitimate references, as warheads of the same
type may have small differences due to irregularities in the production process or other factors.518
Another critical similarity is that the template measurements are highly sensitive and would
need to be securely protected in the database. With biometric data, the risk is that the information
from the database is stolen and could be used for false identification, or that an artificial biometric
data point is constructed such that it matches one of the templates.519 The signature measurement data
obtained from warheads could reveal sensitive design information that could be exploited by
adversaries, or reveal weaknesses about the state’s defense capabilities. In biometric systems, this
challenge is addressed through private verification mechanisms. These systems do not make
comparisons of the original data, but instead employ cryptographic one-way functions to transform
all inputs to the system. The database stores the transformed template, as opposed to the original, and
compares the measurement data after it has been processed by this same function. Thus, even if data
is disclosed, it cannot be used as long as the cryptographic function remains unknown. In addition to
the raw measurements, helper data is also collected in the database creation phase that can be used to
derive the same unique string from the input, such as a fingerprint, even if the measurement is not
perfectly the same. This involves processes such as information reconciliation and privacy
amplification, which handle the inaccuracy and randomness in the measurement data. Overall,
biometric verification systems represent secure mechanisms to accurately authenticate data containing
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some level of uncertainty, while protecting the underlying sensitive information from abuse or
dishonest verifiers.520
In the context of a radiation signature database, similar cryptographic mechanisms could be
used to encrypt the input measurements, protecting the information even if leaked.521 As discussed
earlier, some work has already been done in exploring these methods in the context of protecting
information obtained from warheads.522 The process described above for biometric authentication
systems is only a simplified example of the involved processes, but more advanced mechanisms are
also under development. Ongoing research is exploring concepts such as threshold homomorphic
encryption schemes, where only binary biometric templates are stored and the verification process
does not involve accessing the original template measurement data.523 The processes used in these
approaches also protect the templates against malicious database owners, which is a critical
shortcoming in previous approaches. Overall, biometric authentication systems offer an important
real-world analogy to the challenge of authenticating the reference warhead and could offer a direction
for future study.
Trust in the integrity and confidentiality of nuclear disarmament verification is a critical
precipitating factor that allows states to engage in disarmament. One of the most important
dimensions of this trust is information protection – how well states consider their sensitive or classified
information to be protected in all the complex stages of the process. The risks of unauthorized access
and illegitimate disclosures can emerge both from the technologies utilized, as well as the human
interaction with these systems. Verification protocols founded on physical zero-knowledge proofs
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would be an instrumental contribution to addressing these verification concerns. Their successful
development and implementation could precipitate a paradigm shift in disarmament treaty
architecture, enabling agreements that limit individual warheads. Conceptually, the veil that physics
provides to these approaches enables inherent secrecy, but this lack of transparency also prevents
trust-building.
The critical prevailing challenge in these template-based protocols is the authentication of the
reference warheads. Confidence in the authentication process establishes the foundations of trust in
the entire verification mechanism, which is why it is imperative to identify effective mechanisms to
securely verify the authenticated standard.524 The establishment of a warhead signature database that
contains a comparison point for each warhead type could be one option, among others. These
approaches, however, would require the zero-knowledge property of these verification approaches to
be relaxed. Different concepts from modern cryptography could provide ideas for solving the
subsequent challenges relating to the protection of sensitive information, as biometric authentication
systems have demonstrated in practice.
Even though the prospects for further reductions in the near term are bleak, it is essential to
invest and engage in this fundamental research now to create new verification tools and confidencebuilding assets for when political interests become aligned with disarmament goals. Critically, this
process must be carried out in collaboration with all states with nuclear weapons capabilities, especially
those that have thus far been isolated from the international nuclear policy architecture and security
collaboration. Future verification conditions are likely to engage new states, address novel categories
of nuclear weapons, and target much lower arsenal sizes, all of which create unique pressures for the
verification mechanisms employed. Having the capacity to confidently authenticate, track, and
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dismantle individual warheads will become the priority in these conditions. The failure to develop
sufficient readiness for these new verification requirements could become a significant barrier for
future disarmament efforts.
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Conclusion
The challenge of warhead authentication is an illustrative example of a verification issue where
the current lack of technical capabilities has prevented certain measures of arms control from being
implemented, and where a breakthrough in verification technologies could have a significant impact
in shifting the dynamics of the political discussions. This illuminates how the theoretical processes
discussed in the first chapter are manifested in practice. The development of zero-verification
approaches would eliminate the technical argument that warhead reductions cannot be verified with
a high level of accuracy, or that the verification process would reveal classified information and
therefore threaten national security.525 Thus, these novel verification capabilities would influence the
arguments available both to arms control opponents and proponents, facilitating new treaty
architecture options for further warhead reductions.
It must be recognized that novel verification technologies, such as zero-knowledge verification
approaches, will not be a panacea for making arms control possible. Changes in the available
verification capabilities cannot single-handedly make an arms control agreement possible, in the
absence of political will. They can, however, shift the dynamics of the negotiations by changing the
arguments available to the different stakeholders and creating new, feasible verification options. This
is where the importance of verification technologies lies – they can increase the likelihood of achieving
an agreement in verification provisions, and thus enhance the prospects of future rounds of arms
control.
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This is why the development of novel verification capabilities is important. Even if the new
verification capabilities are never fully implemented in an arms control agreement, their existence
matters, because these new capabilities can both open the dialogue on new treaty architecture options,
as well as shape the political dynamics of the treaty negotiations themselves. In the case of warhead
authentication methods relying on zero-knowledge proofs, these mechanisms may be implemented
jointly with an authentication system relying on the attribute approach, or otherwise be combined with
verification mechanisms that do not rely on ideas drawn from physical cryptography. Even if this new
innovation in warhead authentication methods was not implemented in its full capacity, the
development of this verification approach would have an impact by allowing policymakers to envision
the possibilities of verifying the next stages in warhead reductions, and by shaping the dialogue on
these next steps in arms control.
No verification option will be perfect, and there will always be gaps in confidence about
compliance, which can be operationalized by the opponents of arms control. As was discussed in the
first chapter, however, other factors and processes can help compensate for these gaps in technical
capabilities. Iterated interactions are one important reason why even imperfect verification capabilities
can be sufficient for facilitating cooperation on arms control. Furthermore, as Figure 2 in the first
chapter demonstrated, each larger verification challenge can be disaggregated into separate, specific
challenges. Warhead authentication, for example, is only one of the challenges related to verifying
disarmament agreements that focus on individual warheads, among other challenges that include
tracking the warheads, managing access to the dismantlement facilities, and detecting undeclared
warhead stockpiles. It is not necessary to have all of the verification challenges solved before
negotiations can begin, because solutions in one of the areas can compensate for less progress in
another one. In this view, a feedback loop also exists in the way that these different segments of the
greater verification issue interact with each other. When combined with the fact that the negotiating
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dynamics themselves also help fill the technical gaps that may remain, it is possible to envision how
progress can be driven by incremental enhancements in the available technical verification capabilities.
The current political environment with respect to future reductions in nuclear arsenals remains
challenging. In terms of further bilateral reductions between the United States and Russia, the
domestic political context in both states is currently dire and the relations between the countries are
tense. In discussions after New START was established, Russia has maintained that the next round of
warhead reductions should be carried out multilaterally, calling for other nuclear weapons states to
become involved.526 Other states, however, have argued that further progress must be made in the
U.S.-Russia context before any discussions about the multilateralization of the process. As the United
States and Russia continue to hold approximately 90% of the global nuclear weapons stockpile, this
assertion has clear legitimacy.527
It is conceivable, however, to engage the other nuclear weapons states in efforts that may fall
short of substantive reductions in their nuclear weapons arsenals, but would still contribute to
enhancing the future prospects of multilateral warhead reductions. Engagement in technological
development is one important dimension of this, including in the context of the verification
capabilities discussed in this thesis, and those referred to in Figure 2 in the first chapter. Other
important dimensions for engagement include the development of common definitions about nuclear
weapons terminology; discussing how non-nuclear weapons states could become involved; what role
multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA, will have in multilateral disarmament; and other important
aspects that remain to be contested.528 The P5 states have already engaged in developing a framework
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of definitions, the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, but more work remains to be done in developing a
common language about nuclear arms control, for example with respect to tactical nuclear weapons.529
Ultimately, as a first step towards multilateral arsenal reductions, the other nuclear weapons states
could halt the buildup of their nuclear forces and engage in discussions about the pace and proportion
of eventual warhead reductions.530
Transparency is one critical dimension where progress can be pursued now. The P5 nuclear
weapons states, as well as the non-NPT nuclear weapons states, are in a position to take further steps
towards disclosing information about their nuclear arsenals, stockpiles of fissile material, and other
aspects of their nuclear weapons programs.531 These transparency measures will be important steps in
the path towards multilateral nuclear disarmament, which requires the facilitation of trust between
nuclear weapons states, as well as with the rest of the international community.532 At the moment, the
P5 states take very different approaches to transparency, with the United States providing quite
detailed information about current warhead numbers, whereas other P5 providing little, if any,
information.533 This highlights the fact that decisions about transparency, and its relation to security,
are fundamentally subjective. Thus, the challenge is finding the avenues for transparency that states
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find acceptable and that do not lead to unwelcome tradeoffs with security. The verification approaches
discussed in this thesis do this in the context of warhead authentication, which is a later-stage process,
but progress needs to be made in earlier stages as well. Conceiving ways to prevent information
disclosure about stewardship practices, military facilities, and other sensitive aspects of the operations
of states’ nuclear enterprises will be important for making nuclear weapons states more willing to
engage in transparency measures, paving the way for their involvement in verification processes.
Future stages of nuclear disarmament will be more challenging than the efforts undertaken in
the past, for the reasons discussed in this thesis: addressing lower numbers of warheads, where
uncertainty becomes riskier; considering new categories of weapons under limitations, where past
verification approaches will become impossible; and involving other nuclear weapons states, who see
verification in a different light and may have less advanced capabilities in national technical means.
Especially when thinking about the ‘hardest’ cases of nuclear disarmament, such as between India and
Pakistan or with Israel, concerns about the tradeoffs between secrecy and transparency will become
prioritized. Especially in these types of conditions, novel verification capabilities can make or break
future prospects for arms control.
Important future work needs to be done on the technical side of the verification challenges
discussed in this thesis, as well as on other prevailing verification issues. In addition to this technical
development work, the political dynamics discussed in the first chapter will require more research.
One important question for future investigation is how changes in norms and perceptions about
scientific knowledge, particularly among political elites and leaders, influences the impact of the
dynamics discussed in the first chapter. In a world where scientific expertise is being contested, and
‘alternative facts’ are understood as a part of reality, how is the influence that science and technology
has on public policy modified? As has been discussed in this thesis, technologies are often politicized,
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but this phenomenon of politicization becomes more complex when our understanding of what
constitutes a scientific fact is distorted.
Ultimately, nuclear weapons states’ decisions to disarm their nuclear capabilities are going to
be shaped by a range of strategic, political, and other factors both at the domestic and international
levels. As has been illuminated in this thesis, however, verification capabilities can play a part in
shaping the dynamics of the states’ decision-making processes, especially if and when they engage in
direct negotiations over disarmament efforts. Looking into the future, the technical development of
verification capabilities can be an important path towards making multilateral negotiations on warhead
reductions possible, in parallel with other confidence-building measures among the nuclear weapons
states and with the rest of the international community.
-
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